Generally Speaking

An Answer

2012-03-08T09:26:00.000-05:00

On February 16 I posted a blog titled “Did we Win?” in Iraq. I am pleased to report that we have an official Department of the Army document that answers the question…sort of. The 2012 Army Posture Statement authored by the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff states in the second sentence of page one of a thirty five page document that “The mission in Iraq has ended responsibly”…really? This appears to be as close as we get to an answer from Army “leaders” to the question, notwithstanding the fact that the theme of the Posture Statement is Prevent, Shape, Win.

Did We Win? - Part II

2012-02-22T10:51:00.000-05:00

In my last blog posting I asked the question “Did we win?” in Iraq. The relevance of the question is that it informs our ongoing involvement in Afghanistan. The “Part II” question is “Did we win in Libya?” The stated mission was to protect civilian lives and remove Kaddafi. Both were accomplished at virtually no cost to the U.S. treasury, no U.S. service member’s lives lost and no cry from the international community to spend a trillion dollars to rebuild Libya. President Obama was criticized for leading from behind and allowing NATO to do the heavy lifting. Leading from behind looks pretty smart.
The relevance of asking this question regarding Libya is that today some are calling for the U.S. to intervene in Syria to protect civilians and oust an autocrat…sound familiar? I would suggest that what we learned about winning through our experiences in Iraq and Libya should be used to inform our decision regarding Syria.

Did We Win?

2012-02-16T14:09:00.000-05:00

We Americans are a fundamentally competitive people. Part of that competitive culture is the concept of winning and losing. We ask, “Who won?” regarding everything from Little League games to legal battles and Super Bowls to presidential primaries. This national competitive spirit has served us well and produced great achievements in commerce, diplomacy, national security, and athletics and contributed to the belief in American exceptionalism.
Given this strong belief in competition and its byproduct of winning and losing and our recent withdrawal from Iraq after nine years of war at a cost of more than 4500 American lives and $2 trillion, I find it interesting that no one is asking whether or stating that we won…or lost. No officials in the Obama administration, no Republican presidential candidate, no talking head on television and no newspaper editorial writer has broached the question or offered and answer. If we did win, what did we win and was it worth the cost? I will not bias your answer to this question. “Did we win?” by offering mine, but I will state that I feel strongly that there were four clear winners in Iraq: China, Iran, the Iraqi Shehites, and Halliburton/Blackwater.
One might ask why it is important to engage the question of winning and losing in Iraq. The war is over for the US and our troops have left the country. The importance lays in the fact that we are still choosing to engage in a war in Afghanistan that is costing us $2 billion per week and generating American causalities every month as a result of commitment that is to last through 2014. Between now and 2014 we expect to lose hundreds of American lives and spend a quarter of a trillion dollars (borrowed from the Chinese and others) in Afghanistan. Many of the same questions regarding ends, ways and means that would frame the question of winning and losing in Iraq apply to Afghanistan. The difference is that Iraq is over and Afghanistan rages on. By declining to engage the question of winning or losing in Iraq, we forego the learning it might provide regarding Afghanistan. Perhaps that’s what we want since it’s a tough, potentially embarrassing question. We take this easy road though at the cost of US lives and treasure and create a new set of winners: Pakistan, the Taliban, a corrupt Afghan government supported by the U.S. and of course, Halliburton. If we ask today what a war in 2014 in Afghanistan would look like we should ask if its worth hundreds of American lives and a quarter of a trillion dollars today…in 2014 it’s too late.

Credibility Suffers in Face of DADT Warnings

2012-01-20T11:01:00.000-05:00

The following Op Ed by Major General Laich appeared in the January 23 issue of Army Times.

It has now been almost four months since “don’t ask, don’t tell” was formally repealed on September 20. Four months does not make a history, but none of the catastrophic consequences of repeal predicted by its opponents has come to pass. There have been no mass resignations from the military, no barracks or shipboard riots, no mass gay rights demonstrations on military installations, no massive declines in enlistment or re-enlistment rates, and no declines in morale, discipline and cohesion. Repeal has been the nonevent its advocates predicted that it would be.
Some of the most vocal among repeal’s opponents were many of the military’s “senior leaders” charged with providing the commander in chief, Congress and the American people with their best military advice. The fact is these “senior leaders” were wrong. Whether they were wrong due to their personal biases, pandering to a conservative/evangelical base, or simply out of touch with the service members they are privileged to serve, they were wrong.
The young troops have proved themselves to be more mature, pragmatic and professional than their “senior leaders” projected them to be and, more alarmingly, than the “senior leaders” themselves (with the exception of Admirals (Mike) Mullen and (Robert) Papp). This is an alarming failure that should bring into question the judgment and perhaps the integrity of those “senior leaders” who advocated against repeal.
Many of these same “senior leaders” were perfectly willing, in response to recruiting shortfall in the 2004-2008 time frame, to lower enlistment standards while discharging trained service members under DADT. During that time frame, the Army raised the maximum age for enlistment, lowered the education and physical standards, and granted an all-time high number of moral waivers.
The net effect of these policy positions is that these “senior leaders” would rather man the force with middle-aged, unfit, undereducated felons than with young, fit, educated soldiers with clean police records, simply because of the latter group’s sexual orientation. The policy cost the military the contributions of more than 14,000 fully trained, qualified and, in many cases, combat-experience service members: a cost measured in tax-payer dollars, combat capability and military credibility.
Given the fact that these “senior leaders” appear to have been so wrong and the cost so high, a congressional inquiry, or at least a rigorous after-action review (with the results made public) would be appropriate. If neither is done, one might ask why we should accept the best military advice of these “senior leaders” on future tough issues. Credibility is earned by performance, not conferred by position.

U.S Would Regret Conflict with Iran

2012-01-04T16:01:00.002-05:00

The letter to the editor by Major General Laich that follows was published in the January 3, 2012 edition of the Columbus Dispatch.
I was alarmed by last Tuesday’s letter “U.S. need not fear Iranian threat to Israel” from Austin Reid. It reminded me of the assurances given to the American people prior to the U.S. Invasion of Iraq that the war would be brief, we would be greeted as liberators and Iraqi oil would pay for the war. $2 trillion and 4,400 American lives later we know that this was magical thinking and that the enemy has a vote.
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, a realist not enrolled in the magical-thinking school, said earlier this month that an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities could “consume the Middle East in a confrontation and a conflict that we would regret.”
Reid wrote that “in the aftermath of an Israeli attack, Iran more than likely would respond as did Iraq and Syria and not retaliate” if Israel attacked its nuclear sites. Panetta, a host of national security experts and I disagree.
The conflict that would result would draw in the United States, based on its treaties with Israel; raise oil prices, leading to a double-dip U.S. recession; and unleash terrorist attacks by Iran’s proxies against U.S. targets worldwide, to include the U.S. homeland.
Unlike the Iraqi and Syrian targets Reid refers to having been successfully engaged by Israel in the past, the Iranian nuclear sites are dispersed, dug in and protected by anti-aircraft defenses, thus making an equally successful attack far less likely. Additionally, Israel would have to secure the permission of the Iraqi government to overfly its airspace or violate the airspace and Iraq’s sovereignty, which the United States is committed to protect.
Reid has his history correct, but the military and national security references he draws from it reflect magical thinking.

Doubly Dumb

2011-12-12T10:27:00.001-05:00

Several years ago I was visiting the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks and my host invited me to have lunch with a war college student who was a senior officer in the Mexican military. He laid out the status of the Mexican drug war at the time. Then, the drug war in Mexico was nowhere “on my radar.” Since then I have followed it closely as it has become more intense and far reaching and U.S. civilian law enforcement and military have become more involved on both sides of the border. The U.S. press has also expanded its coverage. The effects of these drug wars in Mexico on overall violent deaths, official corruption, reluctance to invest, and civilian and military enforcements costs have been huge and are growing. Mexico is at the brink of being a failed narco state on our shared southern border of almost 2,000 miles; a compelling threat to our national security. To allow this to happen when there is a partial solution available to the U.S. would be dumb. If this same solution to the Mexican drug crisis would also help solve the U.S. budget deficit problem and we didn’t do it would also be dumb. Thus you have doubly dumb.

The action I allude to above is to legalize marijuana in the United States thus weakening the drug cartels by taking this revenue stream and tax marijuana in the U.S. as we do alcohol and tobacco; two equally pernicious but socially acceptable and heavily taxed vices. I am not suggesting that marijuana is “good” or “helpful.” I am suggesting that there are two good reasons for taking this action that substitutes being pragmatic and smart for being doubly dumb and hypocritical.

Arab Spring-Israeli Winter

2011-11-07T09:25:00.000-05:00

The Middle East appears to be going through two seasons at the same time. On one hand we have the Arab Spring where citizens have risen up, or are rising up to challenge dictators and repressive governments in the name of democracy, freedom, transparency and dignity. The movement has generally been supported by Western nations including the United States even though the movements ultimate outcomes or, in many cases, its leaders are unknown. On the other hand, we see an Israeli Winter, where Israel is becoming increasingly isolated in the Middle East and, as a result, increasingly paranoid (which some may argue is justified).

This paranoia has lead to an alarming development in Israeli politics and public opinion. Recent reports in the Israeli press indicate the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak are working to convince other member of the cabinet and Israeli security officials that Israel must launch a preemptive strike on Iran‘s nuclear program. Israel has taken such actions in the past. In 1981, Israeli aircraft bombed an unfinished nuclear reactor in Iraq, destroying that country’s nuclear program. And in 2007 Israeli warplanes destroyed a site in Syria that the U.N. nuclear watchdog deemed a secretly built nuclear reactor. Neither country retaliated against these acts of aggression. As to public opinion., the Dialog polling institute recently reported that 41% of the Israeli public said they would support an attack and 37% would oppose an attack (with a 4.6% margin of error).

I believe it is wishful thinking to believe that Iran would not respond militarily to an Israeli attack and that the exchange might not lead to a wider war, perhaps involving most, if not all, of the Middle East. If this were to occur, there is no reason to believe that the U.S. would not be drawn into the war. Given the current readiness of the U.S. military after ten years of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, the state of the world economy, and the current U.S. budget deficit and debt, a total war in the Middle East is the last thing America can afford…in terms of blood and treasure. Someone at the White House should call Prime Minister Netanyahu and tell him in the most unambiguous terms as possible that attacking Iran’s suspected nuclear sites is not acceptable and if he chooses to do so nevertheless he and his country are on their own in dealing with the consequences. The U.S. can no longer afford to be a dog being wagged by its tail.

Leaving Iraq

2011-10-26T12:56:00.001-04:00

I am constantly aware of the danger of crossing over from skeptic to cynic as an observer of American national security affairs. Nevertheless I am astonished by the reaction last week to President Obama’s announcement that U.S. troops will leave Iraq after eight years of war, over 4,400 U.S. lives, and more than a trillion dollars spent. My astonishment exists at the political, the strategic and the individual level.

Political opponents of President Obama such as Mitt Romney, Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham and others are criticizing him for executing a status of force agreement negotiated by George W. Bush, who the last I looked, is a fellow Republican. Bush negotiated this agreement before leaving office and Obama never repudiated it. In fact Obama is doing exactly what many Americans say they would like to have elected officials do; fulfill campaign promises. Candidate Obama said he would get us out of Iraq in a first term and never compromised that promise. (I, too, wish he had delivered on some others).

Strategically, some people believe and would like to have others believe that the U.S. now has and will have more influence in Iraq than Iran has. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said recently on Meet the Press, “No one should miscalculate America’s resolve and commitment to helping support the Iraqi democracy” and “We have paid too high a price to give Iraqis the chance. And I hope that Iran and no one else miscalculate that.” The fact is that Iran and Iraq are closely aligned by geography, religion, language, trade and a debt owed to Iran by current Iraqi leaders who lived in exile in Iran during Saddam Hussein’s rule. Muctada al Sadar, a radical cleric who is an Iranian proxy, is the power broker who kept the head of Iraq, Nuri al Maliki, in place. Furthermore the rational for keeping a U.S. military presence in Iraq, protecting Iraqi airspace, stabilizing its borders, and being an intelligence resource do not pass any rational test of demonstrated U.S. capability or intent.

Finally, I have had a number of conversations with my friends, neighbors and acquaintances who feel strongly that the withdrawal is a mistake. The irony of their position is that it not only lacks facts but more importantly the lack of commitment or investment. None of them served in the military and none of them have children or grandchildren who are serving in the military. So when I ask them if they are willing to pay a quarterly war tax to finance the Iraq war or have their children and/or grandchildren drafted to serve in Iraq, all say NO thus identifying themselves a chicken hawks at worst or uninformed limited liability patriots at best.

Failure

2011-10-18T16:04:00.001-04:00

One thing that every U.S. official, military and civilian, who has responsibility for Afghanistan agrees upon is that the eradication of the poppy crop in Afghanistan is critical to defeating the Taliban and establishing some form of stable, democratic, central government there. The United Nations drug control agency reported earlier this week that the amount of land sown with poppies increased by 7% this year. It was the second consecutive year that poppy cultivation rose. This rise has occurred despite hundreds of millions of dollars spent by the U.S. government to disrupt opium smuggling operations and the insurgent networks that profit from them.

Afghan economic realities trump American aspirations and “magical thinking”. We are trying to convince Afghan farmers who have cultivated poppies for generations to grow wheat, pomegranates and saffron instead of poppies which can yield more than $4000 per acre. Do the math. What would you grow? Because of rising prices and higher production the value of the opium produced in Afghanistan is set to more than double this year to $1.4 billion equal to 9% of Afghanistan’s GDP and approximately equal to the government’s annual tax revenues. The majority of that $1.4 billion will flow to the Taliban and Afghan warlords.

After several years of asking the question, “What does success (winning) in Afghanistan look like?” without anything resembling a good answer, I may be a step closer by identifying failure.

"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is officially over!

2011-09-30T12:36:00.002-04:00

http://my.barackobama.com/DADT-Is-History

Click on the link above to see my interview regarding "Don't Ask, Don't Tell."

Difficult Questions

2011-09-20T15:55:00.000-04:00

Late last week I made what may have been a mistake over a cup of coffee by asking a Palestinian friend of mine what he thought of the attacks on the U.S. embassy and NATO headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan earlier in the week (13 September). He quickly told me that he was not supportive of the attacks and was deeply concerned with the ongoing Middle East violence. He said that he was also concerned about American actions in the area and reporting in the American press and asked me three questions along those lines.

First, he asked why it is that when we “take out” a Taliban or Al Qaida leader we say we weaken these organizations but we systematically take out our own leaders when we rotate units and leaders back to the U.S. and do not acknowledge any degradation of effectiveness in the war zone. Second, he asked why the U.S. press and pentagon characterize the successful attacks last week as an indication that Afghan forces are unable to provide for their own defense without U.S. help and ignore the fact that they were unable to do so WITH U.S. help. Might the U.S. presence as an occupying force motivate the attacks? Finally, he found Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s characterization of the action of suicide bombers in the attack as “cowardly” ironic. He asked if this characterization implied that firing a missile from a drone from 7000 miles away was any more heroic. He then offered me a “bonus” question and asked why it was that the U.S. supported the “Arab Spring” in Tunisia, Libya, Syria and Egypt but not in Bahrain, the West Bank or Gaza.

I did not have good answers to any of these troubling questions. The only consolation from the conversation was that he bought the coffee.

Insecurity Through Obesity

2011-09-06T13:33:00.001-04:00

I know that this is a blog focused on national security and military affairs so you may be asking what obesity has to do with national security…read on. National security has many sources in addition to military capabilities. Among the additional sources are diplomacy, education, intellectual property, culture and economic strength. Last year all of Washington was engaged in the health care debate but not one elected or appointed officer or pundit pointed out that fully one third of the American people were clinically obese. Obesity leads to diabetes, heart disease, and respiratory ailments, some forms of cancer and skeletal infirmities, all of which contribute to the 17% plus of GDP we spend on health care in America. Some analysts have said that eliminating obesity in America would reduce health care expenses by 3-4% of GDP, a bigger reduction than all the elements of the legislation that ultimately passed Congress. Yet no one said a word about obesity.

Obviously, obesity affects national security because its cost weakens us economically. Devoting 3-4% of GDP to obesity related health care costs takes money away from education, infrastructure, and research initiatives that strengthen the economy. It also takes money away from military budgets as the Pentagon competes for dollars in a resources scarce environment. This tradeoff is also seen within the defense establishment as the Veteran’s Administration mission is made more complex and expensive as they treat patients who have not only service related injuries and illnesses but also obesity related conditions. Treating our Agent Orange victims is less complicated and more successful if the victim is not obese.

In the future, the American trend toward obesity among our young people will impact the ability to man the All Volunteer Force. More and more potential recruits will be unable to meet minimum height / weight standards for induction, causing the military to lower standards, raise enlistment bonuses, reduce the size of the force or take some other measure in response to the effect obesity will have on recruiting and manning the force.

Politically Correct but Deficient

2011-07-14T14:46:00.001-04:00

Last month I was invited to a briefing in Washington by a panel of four senior Pentagon officials lead by Paul D. Patrick, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. The subject of the briefing was the much anticipated “Comprehensive Review of the Future of the Reserve Component.” The Review was commissioned by the authors’ superiors and provides a politically and bureaucratically correct answer to those superiors and avoids uncomfortable truths present in the real world outside the Pentagon. In addition it fails to note a number of uncomfortable truths within the Reserve Components. Finally, it fails to include input or interests of two key stakeholders, families and civilian employers.

The authors acknowledge that there was no intellectually honest framework that drove the review such as the Military Decision Making Process or the Ends = Ways + Means model. Thus allowing or ensuring that gaps in analysis would exist and facilitating the presence of confirmation bias and the absence of the inputs and interests of big constituencies
critical to the long term success of the Reserve Components. The review’s Executive Summary states that “Since September 11, 2001, the Reserve Component has convincingly confirmed that it can also provide substantial operational capability – capability that effectively enhances the quality of life of DOD’s Active forces by reducing stress…” This statement seems to ignore the stress on Reserve Component service members and their families and employers as evidenced by high suicide and divorce rates, PTSD, drug and alcohol abuse, and civilian career interruptions and civilian job loss. It also fails to address the impact repeated deployments has on the retention of high potential Reserve Component officers and senior NCOs. The review also fails to address a host of leadership issues within the Reserve Components such as high failure rates (or failure to take) on physical fitness tests, failure to meet height/weight standards, turnover and attrition, and turbulence due to reorganization and unit relocations.

I asked five questions at the end of the brief. The first four were answered poorly and the fifth, the briefers didn’t even try to answer. That fifth question was “If a rational decision maker/manager in a civilian organization had the choice to promote or hire among two candidates who were equally qualified but one of the two would be lost to him because of deployment as a Reserve Component service member one out of every five years, which of the two would the rational decision maker choose?” I think the answer is obvious and uncomfortable for the purpose of the review.

One closing point…the Pentagon admits that the review cost the American taxpayer more than two and one half million dollars.

Who will pay?

2011-07-01T09:47:00.001-04:00

One of the critical elements of the strategy for Afghanistan laid out by President Obama last week is that the United States will train and equip an Afghan army and national police force that can defend and secure Afghanistan after 2014, thus allowing U.S. forces to leave. To date, this effort has been marginally successful as it is faced with corruption, desertions, illiteracy, and Taliban infiltration. Assuming, optimistically, that this Afghan force can be established, its annual payroll will be around $11 billion per year. The total tax revenue of the Afghan government is approximately $1.5-2.0 billion per year…a $9.0 billion shortfall. While the U.S. is laying off policemen, firefighters, paramedics and teachers in its own cities and considering reductions to U.S. service members and retirees pay and benefits to reduce the defense budget, who do you think will be paying this $9.0 billion to Afghan soldiers and national police into perpetuity? The argument will be “We spent all that money to create the police and military force. We can’t just walk away from it now.” Perhaps NOW is the time to ask this $9.0 billion question.

Careerism on Steroids

2011-06-13T09:09:00.001-04:00

Recently outgoing Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has made a number of public comments regarding reducing the defense budget. He has already cut a number of weapons programs and proposed the reduction or elimination of more. He has also suggested strongly that changes should be made in personnel programs for current or retired service members and their families in medical benefits, pay, and retirement (for current active service members). All of his recommendations require congressional and or executive branch approvals to achieve savings to reduce the budget deficit.

One program that he could cut with the stroke of his pen is the Pentagon’s Senior Mentors Program. While we are considering cutting benefits to enlisted soldiers (active and retired) and their families the Senior Mentors Program has more than 150 retired three and four star admirals and generals being paid up to $179,000 per year (up to $440 per hour) while also collecting full retirement benefits of up to $220,000 per year. In addition, each of these “mentors” are permitted to be on the payroll of a defense contractor; a conflict of interest waiting to happen as they spy and advocate for their defense contractor employers.

Secretary Gates should terminate this program that facilitates these war profiteers masquerading as mentors before the Pentagon experiences an embarrassment at best and a scandal at worst.

Get Out Now

2011-05-02T13:19:00.002-04:00

All U.S. troops are required to leave Iraq by the end of 2011 in accordance with a formal agreement between the two countries. The agreement further stipulates that the Iraqi government can request that troops remain after 2011 and the U.S. will consider that request subject to negotiations and further agreements. Currently there are 47,000 American troops remaining in Iraq. Recent comments by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and other senior U.S. national security officials and several elected officials have clearly indicated that they would welcome such a request from the Iraqi government and would prefer that it came soon. American officials advocating a presence after 2011 cite three Iraqi areas of need where the U.S. could help; protection of Iraqi airspace, intelligence capabilities, and border security.

American officials contend that the Iraqi government cannot protect its airspace. They identify three threats; Turkish incursions to attack Kurdish rebel enclaves in Kurdistan, Israeli over flights to spy on Iran, and Iranian violations of Iraqi airspace. Turkey and Israel are U.S. allies and Iran is an Iraqi ally. Is it reasonable to think that U.S. warplanes patrolling Iraqi airspace would shoot down aircraft from any of these countries without creating significant problems for the U.S. and / or Iraq? The second reason, intelligence capabilities, is suspect going back to Saddam’s phantom WMD, the U.S. decision to disband the Iraqi army, and the fact that few American intelligence officers even speak the language. Finally, the justification regarding border security is made manifestly suspect by the gross failure of the U.S. government to secure its own southern border.

Staying in Iraq means that we would be spending blood and treasure to support a Maliki government that has concentrated power at the expense of a fragile democracy. Last year’s inconclusive election had Prime Minister Maliki and Ayad Allawi basically tied and only four months ago Maliki was able to form a government because Muktada Al Sader, the radical cleric and head of the Maudi army joined Maliki’s effort to form a government. Maliki is beholden to a “king maker” who the U.S. wanted to arrest and try several years ago. Al Sader vehemently objects to foreign forces in Iraq. Maliki has still not filled the positions of defense minister and interior minister in his cabinet so he holds these critical positions himself. Several months ago Iraq’s highest court, at Maliki’s request, ruled that only the Prime Minister (Maliki) or his cabinet, not members of Parliament, could propose legislation. The same court later added to his power grab by agreeing to let him take control of three formerly independent agencies that run the central bank, conduct elections, and investigate corruptions.

The question of remaining in Iraq after 2011 may be debated at the same time that the U.S. considers its debt and budget deficit crisis. Since invading and occupying Iraq in 2003 the U.S. has lost more than 4,400 service members and spent two TRILLION dollars (all borrowed to be repaid with interest). Recently, Iraq received a 25% increase in GDP while we Americans are paying almost four dollars for a gallon of gasoline. Iraq now pumps 2.7 million barrels of oil per day (up from 1.9 million when we invaded). As the price of a barrel of oil moved from $85 to $110 Iraq receives an additional $67,500,000 per DAY; and an additional $24.6 billion per year. There seems to be something out of balance here.

Going forward, Iraq seems like a bad bet to me. We should honor the current agreement and leave.

Veterans Beware

2011-03-09T18:32:00.001-05:00

As a result of huge federal government debt and ongoing budget deficits, the Pentagon budget is coming under real scrutiny for the first time in years if not decades. Most Americans accept the Pentagon spending out of guilt, ignorance, fear, and limited liability patriotism. Defense contractors and assorted beltway bandits defend it out of greed. Politicians support it out of fear, greed and ambition. Veterans support it out of genuine patriotism, pride, and a loyalty to their service. I would suggest that veterans take a close, objective, look at their support of Pentagon spending.

In a nation that projects trillion dollar budgets over the next several years, how do you justify $7 million per year to sponsor a car on the NASCAR circuit? How do you justify more than $27 million per year to fund the DOD Senior Mentors program (AKA ”careerism on steroids”), which pays retired three and four stars $440 per hour up to $179,000 per year while receiving their full retirement benefits and being on the payroll of a defense contractor? How do you justify the fact that the U.S. defense budget is larger than the defense budgets of the next ten countries combined? How do you rationalize the fact that we are spending $6 billion per month in Afghanistan while we allocate $4.3 billion over four years to fund the Race to the Top, the U.S. government’s signature program to fix the nation’s broken public education system?

My difficulty in answering the questions above turns toward embarrassment as a veteran in light of the fact that the Defense Department is the only major federal government agency whose books are in such disarray that it cannot stand a financial audit. I am not talking about passing the audit; just undergoing one. DOD officials had committed to being able to undergo the audit by fiscal year 2000 but now say it will be 8-10 years before they will be able to do so. DOD officials cannot tell government auditors where more than $700 billion is spent each year. David M. Walker, former comptroller general of the United States has said, “I came to the conclusion that we have built the best fighting forces in the world at a very high cost and with a huge amount of waste. And the nation’s defense strategy is not as comprehensive, integrated, and future focused as it needs to be.”

There is much good that comes from a strong national defense. Informed, objective, patriotic, veterans must take the lead in imposing national thought, discipline and accountability into defense spending. Otherwise, greed, fear, ambition and limited liability patriotism will prevail in weakening national defenses.

Lessons From Egypt

2011-02-17T12:16:00.000-05:00

Recent events in Egypt are indeed historic. They can be viewed through a host of lenses. Among them; the Egyptian people, President Mubarak, the Egyptian military, autocratic rulers in the Middle East and their citizens, terrorist groups like Al Qaida and the Muslim Brotherhood and Western governments. I will focus here on the lens through which the United States government and its national security apparatus has viewed the events at a strategic level and what its implications might be in the future.

First, the events over these eighteen days showcased the clash between U.S. interests and espoused ideals. We attempted to straddle the fence between supporting the justified aspirations of millions of suppressed Egyptians and our own interests in the stability of a long time ally in the region. We knew that whatever position we took had secondary effects in other allied countries in the region led by dictators of suppressed populations. Ideals won out in the end, driven by events fortuitous for the U.S. but we lost some moral authority in the process. It is interesting that the Bush Administration’s “freedom and democracy” agenda in the Middle East is playing out but with a strategy and driving force they never considered. In both Iraq and Egypt dictators were toppled with two differences, one, we liked one of the two dictators and two, one of the actions did not cost the U.S. anything in blood or treasure. And as to final outcomes in the two, I would suggest that Iran is more likely to dominate Iraq’s future policies than the Muslim Brotherhood is to dominate Egyptian politics.

Second, these events illustrate a model or theory of these democratization processes. These types of events fall on a continuum from aspiration, to persuasion, to coercion. The American Revolutions, the Solidarity Movement in Poland, and now the Tunisian and Egyptian movement fall into the aspiration category. Energy and determination came from the people. Persuasion is the least often experienced of the three, but may have been dominant in South Africa and Northern Ireland in our lifetimes. Finally, we have democracy through coercion, best exemplified in Iraq and Afghanistan where the U.S. continues to spend blood and treasure, democracy is foreign, and strong internal cultural, ethnic, and historic forces work against it. Clearly, democracy generated from the aspiration end of the continuum is preferable.

A final observation at the strategic level regards the effect these events may have on the “global war on terrorism” that the U.S. has been fighting for almost ten years at a cost of almost 6,000 lives and two trillion dollars to this point. Al Qaida has identified the overthrow of Mubarak as a primary goal since at least 1996. He has been overthrown and there is no hint of Al Qaida influences or involvement. Tunisia has gone the same route and several other Middle East dictators have taken steps to eliminate or reduce the grievances that Al Qaida has used to justify its movement and motivate its adherents. These aspiration and persuasive democracy movements reduce the market for what Al Qaida has to sell and reduced its effectiveness and brand. Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian issue, and overall U.S. Middle East policy are still potential rally cries for Al Qaida but its market for mayhem has contracted greatly. It remains to be seen whether America can take advantage of these developments in its “war on terrorism.” Watch closely.

Our Heads In The Sand

2011-02-10T16:46:00.001-05:00

Last week I was in Washington D.C. and had the opportunity to hear James Woolsey, former CIA Director, deliver a speech to a selected military audience. I have heard dozens of speeches by people with his background; all smart, articulate, and well informed. Woolsey brought these unique features to his speech…passion and candor. Usually these guys are dull and politically correct.

His theme was to ask and answer the question “What is the most important thing that the United States could do to enhance its national security?” You might expect him to propose things like improve our intelligence capability, to spend more on the military, or win the war on terrorism. But he did not. He laid out a compelling case that the most important single thing that we can do to enhance national security is to dramatically reduce our dependencies on foreign oil and become energy independent…period. In closing, he pointed out that since 1973 (the OPEC oil embargo) when we first became aware of this vulnerability and its adverse consequences we have become even more dependent on foreign oil and have no national energy strategy to address the crisis. Denial, delusion, and self indulgences are hallmarks of disaster.

Terrorism, Cyber War, or Defense?

2011-01-24T06:16:00.000-05:00

On Sunday, January 16, 2011 the New York Times reported at length on the sabotage of equipment critical to the advancement of Iran’s nuclear program. The sabotage was executed through the placement of a “worm” called Stuxnet into the computer programs that control centrifuges to enrich uranium. The article places responsibility for the placement of the “worm” with Israel and the United States with cooperation from Germany. The Israeli and American governments neither admit nor deny that they were responsible. Most Western and Middle Eastern governments applaud the sabotage of the centrifuges.

The facts outlined above beg a question which the New York Times does not address. Was this an act of terrorism directed toward Iran? Was this a first battle in a cyber war against Iran? And, more importantly, will Iran react in-kind against a heavily computer dependent, relatively unprotected American financial, interpersonal, and communication network infrastructure? If Iran succeeded in doing the same to us would we consider it terrorism or cyber warfare?

Institutional Hypocrisy

2011-01-07T14:43:00.000-05:00

It is clear that most Americans were disappointed at best and shocked at worst at the videos by Captain Owen Honors, until recently the commanding officer of the U.S.S. Enterprise. The Navy acted quickly this week to relieve him of command and launch an investigation, dealing with the issue at one level.

But questions remain at a deeper level. Some of his supervisors were aware of the offensive videos in 2006 or 2007 and complaints were filed by some sailors in that time frame. Nonetheless, the Navy promoted him and assigned him as the Enterprise commanding officer. But it wasn’t until the issue became public knowledge last week that the institutional Navy sanctimoniously reacted and disciplined Captain Honors.

So which set of cultural norms and standards of discipline and conduct does the institutional Navy adhere to? Why were complaints about the contents of the videos by some offended crew members (as acknowledged on film by Captain Honors) not pursued by those in charge? Where were the Chaplains, JAGs, and Equal Opportunity Officers on board? Does this flip flop of reactions by the Navy indicate a clear disconnect in values between the U.S. military and the people of the nation it protects and serves. Finally, and most fundamentally, does the Navy condone this type of behavior by its “leaders” unless it becomes public knowledge?

Remember Osama Bin Laden?

2011-01-04T19:39:00.000-05:00

As the 112^th Congress convenes in Washington D.C. in January it will consider a number of issues. Among them will be a defense budget of $720 billion plus and a total intelligence budget of a similar amount (the total intelligence budget is classified). The defense budget is greater than the defense budget of the next ten nations in the world combined. Historically, there are few first order questions asked by the members of the house and senate armed services committees or the press regarding those budgets and the pentagon, the defense contractors, and lobbyists usually get what they want absent the first order questions.

Although I would not consider it a first order question, one question that has not been raised recently in a rigorous manner is “Why have you failed to kill or capture Osama Bin Laden? “ The man is 6’6” tall, his photo is splashed around the world, he is on kidney dialysis, there is a reward of $27 million for his capture, and he sends out videos periodically taunting us. How can a “defense/intelligence” establishment explain this failure and what does it tell us about the effectiveness of this establishment after ten years and the level of support other governments in the “war on terror.”

To this point, talking heads at the Pentagon and CIA have recently told us that Bin Laden’s elimination is not important in the “war on terror.” But rest assured of this, if he is killed or captured, these same talking heads will tout it as one of the great national security accomplishments of our time and perhaps roll out a large “Mission Accomplished” banner. In the meantime it’s not important, just keep writing all the checks.

Ideals Versus Interests

2010-12-14T16:30:00.001-05:00

This week the Obama administration will engage in a review of its Afghanistan strategy which will include an update of the war effort and initiatives going forward. This review has been shaped by agreements made last month with NATO military ministers which would have the United States engaged in Afghanistan through 2014. Afghanistan is already America’s longest war and 2014 marks the date when “conditions based” withdrawals can begin. We should expect some definition of what a “win” in Afghanistan is. We should also expect clear, unambiguous, quantifiable, statements of the “conditions” that will allow withdrawal. Neither is likely to result from the strategy review. Nor will we be told what vital American interests are being protected or preserved in this corrupt, failed nation state. The American people will accept this bureaucratic babble because they are not engaged.

America is not engaged first of all because the war is being fought by less than one percent of the American people at tragic cost to our service members and their families; multiple deployments, high divorce rates, PTSD, prescription and illegal drug abuse, alcoholism, spousal abuse, or suicide crisis, and more than 1,300 deaths. This one percent is made up overwhelmingly of poor kids and patriots from the third and fourth row economic quintiles of our population. And the first quintiles, the well off and well connected are AWOL. A military draft would engage the American people in the longest of their wars.

Secondly, the American people are not engaged because someone else’s money is paying for the war (largely China) at the rate of more than six billion dollars per month. All of it to be repaid in the future with interest. One hundred million American taxpayers would become engaged if each month they received a “war tax” notice from the IRS demanding the immediate payment of their share, sixty dollars.

After nine years this war goes on with no first order questions being asked, no challenges being raised and no outrage being expressed. When the blood and treasure of others is being spent it is easy to have ideals triumph over interests.

What Was Missing?

2010-11-10T15:27:00.001-05:00

America just completed a highly contentious mid-term election that brought about debate on a broad range of issues facing the nation. Many of those issues were technical and specific while others were philosophical and ideological. These elections also showed an unusually large number of examples of person attacks and venom among the candidates. But there were several things not discussed, a “Hound of the Baskervilles” aspect, that concerned me. Principal among these were two aspects of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The first aspect is that these wars are being fought by less than one percent of the U.S. citizens with devastating effects on American service members and their families. In addition to the more than 5,000 casualties and 40,000 serious injuries to our service members we have a military dealing with post traumatic stress disorder, a record divorce rate, rampant use of prescription drugs, lowered enlistment standards, and a suicide crisis. As Americans go about their everyday business and participate in this election the patriotic saying “all gave some, some gave all” morphs into myth or perhaps a lie and gives way to a new reality that “some gave all, most gave nothing, not a bloody thing.”

The second issue absent from the political dialogue is the cost of these wars, especially in light of the fact that deficits, the national debt, and government spending were issues central to most races. It seems as though the national defense cabal has convinced the American people that defense spending is “off the table” in budget debates while social security, Medicare/Medicaid , education, health care, energy independence and infrastructure are fair game. We spend more on defense in the United States than the next ten countries in the world combined and borrow most of it (a significant portion from China) and all of it will have to be repaid with interest. So while we secure and rebuild Baghdad and Kabul, Cleveland and Kalamazoo crumble. Specifically, as an example, we spend $6 billion a month on these wars while the total funding for three years for the Race to the Top, the centerpiece of education reform in the United States, is $4.3 billion; a 50 to 1 ratio. It may be time to put some other things “on the table”, while we still have a table.

Audit Casts Bad Light On Board, Military

2010-10-21T12:23:00.003-04:00

[Letter to the Editor, Columbus Dispatch, October 21st, 2010]

As a retired senior military officer, I was angered and embarrassed by the results of the audit of the Franklin County Veterans Service Commission (Dispatch article, Oct. 1). I am angered because deserving veterans and their families are being poorly served or not being served at all — one in six Franklin County veterans goes to other counties for services.

I am embarrassed because the audit results reflect negatively on the U.S. military.

At best, the results reflect incompetence and self-serving on the part of the executive director and the board members, resulting in a loss of confidence by taxpayers, commission employees and, most important, veterans and their families in Franklin County.

At worst, they represent criminality and malfeasance. Given this gross dereliction of duty by the executive director and the board of directors, I strongly call on them to act honorably and resign immediately.

MAJ. GEN. DENNIS LAICH
U.S. Army, retired
Powell

Mission Impossible

2010-10-13T16:46:00.001-04:00

If one looks closely at the stream of current developments in Iraq and Afghanistan and projects realistically into the future, the outlook on these fronts in the U.S. “Global War on Terrorism” does not look encouraging. These are the two main and most visible battlegrounds the U.S. has chosen to pursue with stable democracies, strong allies, and a message to other countries (allied and enemy) about the strategic goals we have established.

In Iraq, it appears that an eight-month long political battle for the Prime Minister post will be resolved because Mustada Al Sudr (described by most U.S. sources as a “radical anti-American cleric”) has chosen to support Nauri Al Malaki. Sadr is the same man U.S. forces labeled an insurgent in 2006 and sought to arrest or kill. In response, he went into self-imposed exile… in Iran. He also ordered his Maudi army to stand down while the U.S. “surge” played out and the U.S. “bought” 100,000 fighters called the Sunni Awakening. It is reasonable to think that politics is universal and Sadr will get something big from Malaki. Sadr will be only the most visible among a host of Iraqi politicians aligned with and indebted to Iran. Despite the expenditure of 4,400 U.S. lives, more that $1 trillion and significant diplomatic capital, no one should be surprised if five years from now Iraq allies itself more closely with Iran than America.

There is little encouraging news coming out of Afghanistan at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels. Casualties among U.S. and NATO forces are rising rapidly. The highly touted offensive in Marja is a failure at worst and a draw at best and the Kandahar offensive is stillborn. Finally, Afghan President Karzi is pursuing peace talks with the Taliban, much to the dismay of the U.S. Pakistan is an uncertain U.S. ally with huge internal problems exacerbated recently by devastating floods and a feckless government response. Rumors circulate that the military is again considering a coup and that former strongman Musharoff (now in exile) is considering a political comeback. The U.S.-Pakistan “alliance” is strained by the intrusion of sovereign Pakistan territory by NATO forces and civilian deaths by U.S. attacks and Pakistan’s decision to close off supply routes into Afghanistan in response. A final source of stress between the two is Pakistan’s support or tolerance of the Taliban and the Haquanni network along its western border. There is no American success in Afghanistan without Pakistan sharing U.S. goals and perspectives and that is not the case today. As I have written previously, there are only two questions in Afghanistan: Do you want to lose big or do you want to lose small? And do you want to lose sooner or do you want to lose later?

Spin doctors at the White House, State Department and the Pentagon will burn the midnight oil convincing themselves and the American people that Iraq and Afghanistan represent Mission Accomplished.

Why the GOP Should Repeal DADT

2010-09-28T10:33:00.001-04:00

by Bret Stephens, WALLSTREET JOURNAL, 21 Sep 10

“Gay-Pride Parade Sets Mainstream Acceptance of Gays Back 50 Years.” The line is a bit of satire from the Onion. But it came to mind after Lady Gaga released a video last week urging Congress to repeal Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, or DADT. “We’re asking you to do your job, to protect the Constitution,” says the 24-year-old professor of jurisprudence.

Great. Maybe now that Harry Reid plans to bring repeal to a vote as part of the 2011 Defense bill, advocates can enlist Marilyn Manson to make a personal approach to Senate Republicans James Inhofe and Jim DeMint. That should win them over.

For a more sober view of the subject, turn to Dennis Laich, a self-described “old, bald, straight guy.” Mr. Laich has none of the glamour of Lady Gaga, but on this subject he has one valuable credential: He retired from the U.S. Army in 2006 after a 35-year career in the reserves that began in field artillery, included tours of duty in Honduras, Germany, the Netherland, Kuwait and Iraq, and culminated in a command position at Ft. Devens as a Major General. Unlike Adm. Mike Mullen, the Joint Chiefs chairman who has also expressed reservations about the policy, he has no liberal political masters to please. But he still thinks DADT is nuts.

The strength of the general’s case is that it’s not about “rights,” gay or otherwise, much less whatever Lady Gaga happens to think is in the Constitution. It’s about the interests of the military itself, starting with its values. “If you talk to most theologians, ethicists or philosophers, they’ll tell you there are two kinds of lies, of commission or omission,” he says. “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell represents a lie of omission that is inconsistent with the values of a military organization that presents itself as values-based.”

The values argument isn’t the half of it. Since DADT came into force in 1993, some 14,000 service members have been discharged under the policy-the equivalent of an entire division of war fighters. Investigating and processing each case has its costs; so does recruiting and training each replacement. How much? A 2006 commission organized by UCLA;s Palm Center and led by former Defense Secretary William Perry put the total cost of each discharge at $42,835, meaning the policy has now cost the U.S. taxpayer around $600 million.

That’s not pocket change, especially for a military scrounging for savings. It’s also no small matter at a time when the military’s recruitment standards for age, education, physical fitness and moral standards have been steadily declining. In the last two years alone the Army and Marines have granted an unprecedented number of “moral waivers” to recruits with previous felony convictions.

The result, Mr. Laich acidly notes, is that “we would rather have in our military middle-aged, overweight, undereducated felons than fully qualified, experienced patriots who happen to have a sexual orientation that some people find troublesome.”

Nor does it help that DADT has given top universities a handy alibi to exclude ROTC from their campuses, and the students at those schools a reason not to serve. Would lifting DADT increase recruitment at schools like Harvard and Yale? Probably only at the margins. But it would help end the poisonous estrangement, with all its larger political consequences, between America’s military and our intellectual elites.

But what about the argument that allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly in the military would harm recruitment, morale and unit cohesion? Mr. Laich doesn’t buy it. Existing military regulations strictly prohibiting or regulating sexual conduct would still apply, and violators would continue to be punished. NATO militaries, as well as Israel’s, have integrated gay service members without issue. And similar arguments to the ones being made now against repealing DADT were made when African Americans, and later women, were integrated into the army.

“Five years from now we’ll look back at this and say, what was all the fuss?” he says. “These young soldiers, sailors and Marines come from a society where gays and lesbians are readily accepted and work with them and go to school with them.”

In the meantime, it’s worth noting that there are an estimated 48,000 homosexuals on active duty or the reserves, many of them in critical occupations, many with distinguished service records. If they pose any risk at all to America’s security, it its, paradoxically, because DADT institutionalizes dishonesty, puts them at risk of blackmail, and forces fellow war fighters who may know about their orientation to make an invidious choice between comradeship and the law. That’s no way to run a military.

Republican senators are now bellyaching that Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid intends to jam the repeal amendment into a bill they have no real choice but to vote for. They should be silently thanking him. He’s giving them the chance to do the right thing while blaming the Democrats for it. It’s a GOP twofer, plus a vote they’ll someday be proud of.

Military “Leaders”

2010-09-23T14:16:00.001-04:00

The sanctimonious rhetoric consistently offered up/about “lacking care of the troops and their families” is being exposed as hollow for thousands of those service members. Lawmakers and veteran advocates criticized Defense Department Officials last week for continued questions surrounding personality disorder discharges by DOD, a practice critics say allows the military to avoid paying for some war injuries by blaming problems instead on pre-existing medical conditions. In 2009, the military discharged more than 2000 patriotic service members for conditions DOD says were lingering from before their enlistment. Every one of these service members underwent a pre-enlistment physical and found to be fit for services.

Troops who are found to have pre-existing medical conditions or mental disorders that would make them unsuitable for continued military service can be dismissed from the service, denied long term veteran’s medical care and even forced to repay their enlistment signing bonus even if they’ve already served in combat and sustained injuries there.

As the Defense budget comes under increasing pressure, bureaucrats and bean counters have found a cost cutting practice at the expense of those who willingly served and sacrificed. Chairman of the House Veterans Affairs Committee, Bob Filner, D-California, frustrated by DOD and VA actions, stated “This begs the question of how many soldiers have to commit suicide, go bankrupt, and end up homeless before real action is taken to remedy this problem?”

A Question of Treasure

2010-09-15T06:33:00.001-04:00

Most discussions about the ongoing endorsement of the United States in Afghanistan are centered on the number of American troops on the ground, their projected withdrawal beginning in late 2011 and the ability of the Afghan army and national police to increase their strength and capabilities despite corruption, desertion and illiteracy.
Building and maintaining this Afghan force will take money and it will come from the United States. The United States had spent over $20 billion training Afghan forces between 2003 and 2009 and expects to spend about the same this year and next alone. From 2012 to 2015 the U.S. military plans to spend an average of $6.2 billion per year. Adding it up, by 2015 we will have spend over $60 billion training Afghan forces. By comparison the total annual gross domestic product of Afghanistan is $14 billion. The irony of all this is that we are borrowing this money from China and will be required to repay it with interest.
These facts and figures will become painfully relevant as we struggle with ongoing budget deficits and rising national debts in the United States. While Cleveland and Kalamazoo crumble we may take solace in the fact that we are securing and rebuilding Kandahar and Kabul.

2010-08-27T15:44:00.000-04:00

The Mosque Debate: Larger Ramifications

Billions of Muslims throughout the world are not blind or deaf to the “debate” over the proposed Muslim Community Center in New York City. In my opinion, it creates the most powerful recruiting poster that Al Qaieda and the Taliban have had since Abu Ghraib. Furthermore, it creates a bigger threat to US troops on the ground trying to win hearts and minds in Iraq and Afghanistan than the release of classified documents by Wiki leaks. The politicians and pundits participating in this dysfunctional behavior need to think beyond their own election or ratings.

2010-08-26T11:04:00.002-04:00

Careerism and Army "Mentors"

Careerism, the propensity of officers to be more concerned with promotions and the perks of their position than the well being of their troops and success in combat, has been a problem since nations have had the standing, “professional” militaries. In the United States, it peaked as a problem during the Vietnam era and was studied and identified as a contributor to our failure in that war. Today, we are metastasizing the problem through the Pentagon’s senior mentors program, which allows retired three and four-star admirals and generals to act as highly paid (with taxpayer dollars) consultants to the military while simultaneously receiving their pensions and being on the payroll of defense contractors; an invitation to conflict of interest and scandal through careerism on steroids.
While the nation comes to grips with a staggering national debt and budget deficits projected far into the future, the Pentagon budget of more than $700 billion has remained largely untouchable. Recently, many analysts have said that health care benefits earned by retirees are unsustainable, and Secretary of Defense Gates has offered several spending cuts aimed at redundant weapons programs and useless stateside commands. Nevertheless, this senior mentor program allows a participant to earn up to $230,000 per year at $440 per hour while collecting a pension of up to $220,000 per year and being on the payroll of a defense contractor. To make matters even more alarming, the Pentagon refuses to reveal the names of the participants in the program or their affiliations. USA Today has identified 158 mentors and found that 80% had defense industry ties.
Most of these “mentors” are the very architects of policies and strategies that led to problems and failures on the part of the Pentagon, but are now paid by the same Pentagon to pass on and rationalize their failed approaches to a next generation. A chilling aspect of this model is that the current cohorts of active duty -- three and four stars that support the mentors program -- can reasonably expect to have the opportunity to be mentors when they retire, thus perpetuating this scandal in waiting. Finally, the program subverts the responsibility that every officer serving actively has to mentor subordinates for whom he or she serves as rater or senior rater.
Rather than having lawyers and bureaucrats modify the rules of the program for over-the-hill war profiteers around its edges, Secretary Gates should kill the senior mentors program before the scandal occurs.

2010-08-18T14:49:00.000-04:00

Published in USA TODAY August 5th, 2010

Leaders, rules add to Army troubles

In USA today's article about the Army's suicide crisis, Gen. Peter Chiarelli, the Army vice chief of staff, said commanders might let an arrest for drunken driving go unpunished to allow a soldier to go to war (“Leaders criticized in Army suicides,” News Friday)
Of the commanders of the 25,283 soldiers who had committed violations that could have resulted in a discharge from the Army, how many were reprimanded or relieved as a result of their choice to allow these “high-risk” soldiers to remain? Senior leaders condoned this dereliction of duty and now sanctimoniously criticize it with a wink.
The Army study about the suicide rate implies that leaders do not “know” their soldiers well enough to identify their high-risk behaviors or their propensity to commit suicide.
I find this view ironic at best and hypocritical at worst in light of the Army's “don't ask don't tell” policy. The policy specifically precludes frontline leaders from knowing something as basic as the sexual orientation of the soldiers they have the privilege of leading.
The Army has serious problems that won't be solved by poor discipline on the part of senior leaders or policies based on lies of omission.

Dennis Laich
Major General, US Army retired
Powell, Ohio

ENDS = WAYS + MEANS

2010-07-29T20:55:00.002-04:00

Recently there has been a lot of talk by pundits, politicians, analysts, and the general public about our involvement in Afghanistan. It has been energized by the downsizing of our Iraq footprint, the change of command there (Patraeus over McCrystal) and the realization that we have been there nine years with rising casualty rates and significant dollar outlays with little positive impact after the first of those nine years. I believe that this talk is generally unstructured and would suggest that using the same analysis model used by the military and civilian national security community at the strategic level would be helpful.
The model is known as “ends, ways, and means,” where ENDS = WAYS + MEANS. Ends are defined as the strategic outcomes or end states desired. Ways are defined as the methods, tactics, and procedures, practices, and strategies to achieve the ends. Means are defined as the resources required to achieve the ends, such as troops, weapons systems, money, political will, and time. The model is really an equation that balances what you want with what you are wiling and able to pay for it or what you can get for what you are willing and able to pay.
Regarding Afghanistan, if you solve the equation from left to right, stating specifically the end “your desire, you then must identify what ways and means would be required to achieve that end. (One basic question in addressing the ends is whether we are conducting counter terrorism or counter insurgency operations.) You would have to identify how many U.S. casualties you are willing to suffer (to date 1064 KIA), how much money you are willing to spend (now at $7 billion per month), how reliable the Karzai government is as a partner, and what role the Taliban, Pakistan, India, and our allies are willing and able to play and for how long. Solving the equation from right to left, you would identify the ways and means you are willing and able to generate and thus establish the “end” they are able to achieve.
I would submit that a rigorous, intellectually honest exercise of this model explains the frustration we now feel with Afghanistan. If we state unambiguously a worthy “end,” we may be unable or unwilling to generate the ways and means to achieve it. If we honestly state the ways and means we are willing and able to generate, the end they deliver may be suboptimal at best and an outright loss at worst. Two questions then may emerge. One, do we want to lose sooner or do we want to lose later? Two, do we want to lose big or do we want to lose small? Referencing Alexander the Great, Britain, and Russia, Afghanistan has never provided happy endings.

2010-06-30T13:45:00.000-04:00

Last week ,our nation’s capital, the news media, and most of our allies were captivated by the sacking of a four-star Army general commanding thousands of troops in the Afghan war. The Commander in Chief did the right thing in sacking him and Gen. Stanley McChrystal did the right thing in acknowledging his mistakes and exiting quietly. This was a positive example of leadership, accountability and transparency. Unfortunately, these same attributes were not apparent in a much less publicized decision by senior Army leaders dealing with their own subordinates. On July 13, 2008, as many as 200 insurgents attacked a virtually indefensible position without even minimum logistical or tactical support by its higher commands at company, battalion, or brigade levels. The attack at the village of Wanat near the Pakistan border left nine U.S. soldiers dead and 27 wounded. Comprehensive investigations into the incident found that the three commanders at the company, battalion and brigade were guilty of “dereliction of duty” and negligence. Shockingly, Gen. Charles Campbell cleared the three officers of all charges and told the families of the nine dead soldiers that “punishing the three would have a chilling effect on other battlefield commanders who have to make crucial decisions.” No reprimand, no court martial, no discharge from the Army for these three “leaders.” This decision’s chilling effect will be on soldiers, their families, and all Americans who are aware of this institutional dereliction of duty.

The Korea Situation

2010-06-14T08:52:00.001-04:00

Recent events on the Korean Peninsula present several challenges for the United States on several levels: strategic, operational and tactical. South Korea’s foreign minister said on May 19 that it was “obvious” that North Korea fired a torpedo that sank one of the South’s warships, the Cheonan, in March, killing 46 sailors. His statement was based on the findings of a multinational investigation lasting several months in which the United States was an active participant. The conclusions are based on both physical evidence and intelligence on the movement of North Korean submersibles and analysis of intercepted North Korean communications. To date, the U.S response, as expressed by State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley, is that North Korea must “cease provocative acts, cease acts of aggression that destabilize the region” and the United States urged the North to follow through on past commitments to abandon its nuclear program. There is also considerable diplomatic chatter about taking the issue to the UN Security Council. North Korea has stated that any military action against North Korea in response to the sinking of the Cheonan will result in “all-out war.”

The strategic reality is that the key player in any U.S.-initiated or supported effort to seriously sanction North Korea diplomatically or economically is China. China and the United States have diametrically opposed national interests relative to the Korean Peninsula. China wants a stable North Korea, and a divided peninsula. The U.S. wants a destabilized peninsula. This could ultimately result in millions of North Korean refugees flooding into China and the possibility (although remote) of a desperate North Korean regime pointing nuclear armed missiles at China. Such missiles would be difficult to intercept due to the short flight distance and would ultimately bring a unified democratic Korea on its border, a major U.S. aspiration. The irony of this is that since China is the United States’ biggest creditor, it would be loaning the United States the money to finance these problems for itself. The U.S. problem is the fact that one of its closest allies had one of its warships sunk in an unprovoked, surprise attack in international waters and it can do little about it. The limits of U.S. power and influence are showcased to its allies and enemies.

At the operational and tactical levels, the picture is equally bleak. If “all-out war” were to resume on the peninsula, it would be devastating because the North Korean regime knows it would be fighting in an “end game.” The largest population center in South Korea, Seoul, is within range of North Korean conventional artillery. Unless Seoul was essentially evacuated prior to the start of hostilities, civilian casualties would be devastating. The 28,500 U.S. service members currently in South Korea would be a primary target for a numerically overwhelming North Korean army that could quickly move south with little logistical support and no airlift required. How much combat power can a U.S. military generate that is already strained fighting two wars for seven to nine years, 7,000 miles to its east, and now fight another one 7,000 miles to its west? The logistics of such a scenario are staggering.

At the tactical level, fighting would be bloody and intense and could range from bayonets to nuclear armed ballistic missiles. The North Korean regime would be fighting for its life and would not be inclined toward early peace negations or half measures. This mindset leads to protracted conflicts, which in this case leads to significant civilian casualties in a densely populated South Korea, while the North Korean regime does not care about civilian casualties in the North or the South. Conversely, high civilian casualties do create a problem for the United States, as it would attempt to maintain its position on a moral high ground and maintain worldwide support for its actions and their consequences.

I am not advocating or discouraging any U.S. option. This is a situation that we should all monitor closely as it presents a range of problems for the United States and a relatively small array of bad options in response, with meaningful medium and long-range consequences.

2010-05-21T11:14:00.001-04:00

May 18, 2010

As the world considers the prospect of a nuclear armed Iran, there is a lot of chatter not only among pundits but also among the national security establishment about our response. Many say that sanctions are ineffective to date and unlikely to cause Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions in the future. There is also a lot of discussion about the “military option” remaining on the table.

The problem with the public discussion of the “military option” to date is what is not being discussed. No one is asking about or talking about the Iranian response or its effect on the world and the Middle East economically, diplomatically or militarily.

The discussion implies that Iran will do nothing. However, a likely Iranian response might include closing shipping in the Straits of Hormuz, thus causing the price of oil to move from its current $75 per barrel to $200 plus per barrel, leading to a recession if not a depression. Iran could also have Hamas, Hezbollah and other allied terrorist organizations attack soft U.S. targets around the world to include those on U.S. soil. These targets could include European and Middle Eastern allies, leading to a much broader Middle East war. It will also hurt U.S. relations with the Muslim world if we were to attack or invade a third Muslim nation in a ten-year period. Finally, with the national debt soaring, can we afford it and will the Chinese government continue to be our banker if we use the money we borrow from them to have their cost of oil more than double?

Before we take Senator John McCain’s advice to “pull the trigger,” rational, responsible people should think through the consequences of their actions and recognize the well-known military rule…”The enemy has a vote.”

Few Are Shouldering the Burden of War

2010-01-29T10:20:00.002-05:00

Sunday, November 29, 2009 3:39 AM

President Barack Obama will deliver a speech Tuesday to outline his strategy going forward in Afghanistan ("Obama to expand Afghan war effort," Associated Press article, Wednesday Dispatch). Pundits say he will try to convince the American people of its merits, and Obama has said, "I feel very confident that when the American people hear a clear rationale for what we're doing there and how we intend to achieve our goals, that they will be supportive."
Americans have not been supportive since the war began. The war has been fought by a small segment of the population in an all-voluntary military, drawn overwhelmingly from the third and fourth socioeconomic quintiles of our nation, while the first quintile, the wealthy, powerful and well-connected, has been AWOL. Our military is filled through recruiting and retention bonuses, which I do not begrudge, and lowered age, physical-fitness, education and moral standards. We pay for these wars in funds borrowed from the Chinese, while they invest in their infrastructure and secure natural resources around the world, while our infrastructure and manufacturing base crumble.
We pass the bill for this choice onto our children and grandchildren: an act of fiscal cowardice. A responsible national dialogue on Afghanistan should include the resumption of mandatory universal military service and a war surtax to pay the costs as they are incurred.
If we are unwilling to make these two issues a central element of the Afghanistan strategy, we will continue to be a nation of "chicken hawks" and intergenerational freeloaders unable to say, "All gave some; some gave all," but doomed to say, "Some gave all; most gave nothing, absolutely nothing."

DENNIS LAICH Retired Major General, United States Army
Powell

Afghanistan Speech Leaves Unanswered Questions

2010-01-29T10:16:00.002-05:00

The Columbus Dispatch (Ohio)
Date: Saturday, December 12 2009

President Barack Obama 's exquisitely delivered "Way Forward in Afghanistan" speech on Dec. 1 reminded me of Sherlock Holmes in The Hound of the Baskervilles. In that novel, Holmes solves the mystery based on what did not happen. The hound did not bark, therefore the murderer must have been known to the famous canine. Before the speech, Obama said, "I feel very confident that when the American people hear a clear rationale for what we're doing there and how we intend to achieve our goals, that they will be supportive." In fact, he failed to address six critical questions that did not "bark":

* How will we pay for the additional 30,000 troops? The incremental cost is $30 billion per year on top of the $75 billion we are already spending in Afghanistan. The national debt is now $12 trillion. One might ask: What is a greater threat to U.S. national security, the Taliban controlling Afghanistan or the Chinese saying they will no longer buy U.S. Treasury bills?

* What is the critical national-security interest in Afghanistan? If it is to deny al-Qaida safe haven, what is to keep them from continuing to operate in Pakistan or in Somalia, Yemen or Indonesia? Does this strategy imply that we will invade these countries next? Al-Qaida is a global terrorist organization that does not recognize national borders.

* Are we fighting a counterinsurgency against the Taliban or anti-terrorism against al-Qaida? The two are vastly different campaigns with different costs, tactics, geographic scope, intelligence requirements and implications for alliances. Or, are we trying to do both and in so doing driving the Taliban and al-Qaida to alliances with one another? The best current estimate of U.S. intelligence agencies is that there are approximately 100 al-Qaida operatives in Afghanistan.

* How committed is NATO? Of the 7,000 additional troops promised by NATO, 1,500 are already in Afghanistan, sent months ago to bolster security during the presidential election. Two allies, Canada and the Netherlands, still plan to withdraw 5,000 troops in the next two years, offsetting the increase. Additionally, an undisclosed number of new troops will steer clear of any fighting because they are barred by their governments from combat operations, and many of the rest are barred from any nighttime combat operations. Only the British and Australians have rules of engagement similar to the U.S. One might also question whether Pakistan is a helpful ally in this effort, evidence to date strongly suggests that it is not. Finally, civilian support to nation-building and distribution of humanitarian aid is ineffective due to a lack of security, organization, unified leadership and funding.

* Is the Afghan national army capable of becoming viable? The plan is to increase the Afghan army from its current strength of 92,000 to 134,000 by 2011 to facilitate a U.S. exit. The implication in the president's speech is that additional U.S. trainers will enable this growth. He assumes that young Pashtun tribesmen, 75 percent to 90 percent of whom are illiterate, will sign up to fight and die in support of the corrupt, ineffective narco-state known as the Karzai government and put their families in jeopardy of Taliban reprisals in their absence. This goal also ignores the current 30 percent desertion rate in the Afghan army. Finally, President Hamid Karzai has stated that it will be 15 to 20 years before Afghanistan is capable of self-defense without U.S. assistance.

* What is the effect on the U.S. military? In 2005, military analysts inside and outside of the Pentagon were asking whether the Army and Marine Corps were simply stressed or on the verge of breaking. In the interim, deployment cycles have remained rapid. Suicides, drug use, post-traumatic stress disorder and divorce rates in the military have increased. At the same time, the military's initial entry standards for age, physical fitness, education and moral conduct have been lowered. An "all-volunteer" military vision of excellence may have been compromised by an unrelenting, unshared burden. Given this, could the U.S. mount a credible military response in Iran, Korea, the Taiwan Strait or to a significant attack on the U.S. homeland?
I believe these are critical questions that, if Sherlock Holmes were president, he would have asked. Knowing that these questions did not "bark" in the president's speech makes it difficult for many Americans to justify his stated confidence that they will be supportive.

DENNIS J. LAICH \ U.S. Army, retired \ Powell

About The State of Diversity Today

2009-12-30T17:49:00.000-05:00

The Army Times published my letter on 12-03-09:

Letter to the Editor: The Army Times, Maj. Gen. Dennis J. Laich (ret.)
"A policy of delusion"
Letter to the editor
December 7, 2009
The Army Times

As news media reported the tragic events at Fort Hood, Texas, I read with particular interest the comments of Gen. George Casey, the Army chief of staff. He said, “Our diversity, not only in our Army, but in our country, is a strength. And as horrific as the tragedy was, if our diversity becomes a casualty, I think that’s worse.”

He expressed the legitimate concerns of a senior leader. However, I find his comments ironic at best and hypocritical at worst given that the Army legitimizes discrimination and bludgeons diversity every day as it executes its don’t ask, don’t tell policy, which forces the 65,000 patriots currently serving in our military to hide or lie about their own identity.

It is also an affront to those 13,000 veterans separated under this policy, many of whom were combat veterans or had critical skills. Don’t ask, don’t tell is a policy of delusion that acknowledges that gays and lesbians serve in our military but pretends they’re not there.

In the spirit of his expressed concerns regarding protecting diversity in our Army, I would urge Gen. Casey to aggressively advocate for the repeal of don’t ask, don’t tell. Diversity is best supported by the courageous expression of truth.

— Maj. Gen. Dennis J. Laich (ret.), Powell, Ohio

2009-12-29T09:40:00.002-05:00

Retired Major General Dennis Laich, AUS Laich had a distinguished 35-year career in the Army Reserve, 14 of which were spent in various command positions, the last as commander of the 94 th Regional Readiness Command in Ft. Devens, MA. His business career began in 1972 with Corning Glass Works and included positions with LTV Steel and Navistar International.

Laich holds a bachelor’s degree in Political Science from Lafayette College, and master’s degrees from West Virginia University and St. Francis College in Business Administration and Labor Relations. He completed postgraduate studies at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and is a graduate of the Army War College.

He is currently serving as Ohio Dominican’s PATRIOTS Program Director. General Laich is the University’s support liaison for veterans applying for the PATRIOTS program, providing one-on-one assistance and linking them with resources they need to meet their educational goals.