All U.S. troops are required to leave Iraq by the end of 2011 in accordance with a formal agreement between the two countries. The agreement further stipulates that the Iraqi government can request that troops remain after 2011 and the U.S. will consider that request subject to negotiations and further agreements. Currently there are 47,000 American troops remaining in Iraq. Recent comments by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and other senior U.S. national security officials and several elected officials have clearly indicated that they would welcome such a request from the Iraqi government and would prefer that it came soon. American officials advocating a presence after 2011 cite three Iraqi areas of need where the U.S. could help; protection of Iraqi airspace, intelligence capabilities, and border security.
American officials contend that the Iraqi government cannot protect its airspace. They identify three threats; Turkish incursions to attack Kurdish rebel enclaves in Kurdistan, Israeli over flights to spy on Iran, and Iranian violations of Iraqi airspace. Turkey and Israel are U.S. allies and Iran is an Iraqi ally. Is it reasonable to think that U.S. warplanes patrolling Iraqi airspace would shoot down aircraft from any of these countries without creating significant problems for the U.S. and / or Iraq? The second reason, intelligence capabilities, is suspect going back to Saddam’s phantom WMD, the U.S. decision to disband the Iraqi army, and the fact that few American intelligence officers even speak the language. Finally, the justification regarding border security is made manifestly suspect by the gross failure of the U.S. government to secure its own southern border.
Staying in Iraq means that we would be spending blood and treasure to support a Maliki government that has concentrated power at the expense of a fragile democracy. Last year’s inconclusive election had Prime Minister Maliki and Ayad Allawi basically tied and only four months ago Maliki was able to form a government because Muktada Al Sader, the radical cleric and head of the Maudi army joined Maliki’s effort to form a government. Maliki is beholden to a “king maker” who the U.S. wanted to arrest and try several years ago. Al Sader vehemently objects to foreign forces in Iraq. Maliki has still not filled the positions of defense minister and interior minister in his cabinet so he holds these critical positions himself. Several months ago Iraq’s highest court, at Maliki’s request, ruled that only the Prime Minister (Maliki) or his cabinet, not members of Parliament, could propose legislation. The same court later added to his power grab by agreeing to let him take control of three formerly independent agencies that run the central bank, conduct elections, and investigate corruptions.
The question of remaining in Iraq after 2011 may be debated at the same time that the U.S. considers its debt and budget deficit crisis. Since invading and occupying Iraq in 2003 the U.S. has lost more than 4,400 service members and spent two TRILLION dollars (all borrowed to be repaid with interest). Recently, Iraq received a 25% increase in GDP while we Americans are paying almost four dollars for a gallon of gasoline. Iraq now pumps 2.7 million barrels of oil per day (up from 1.9 million when we invaded). As the price of a barrel of oil moved from $85 to $110 Iraq receives an additional $67,500,000 per DAY; and an additional $24.6 billion per year. There seems to be something out of balance here.
Going forward, Iraq seems like a bad bet to me. We should honor the current agreement and leave.
Monday, May 2, 2011
Wednesday, March 9, 2011
Veterans Beware
As a result of huge federal government debt and ongoing budget deficits, the Pentagon budget is coming under real scrutiny for the first time in years if not decades. Most Americans accept the Pentagon spending out of guilt, ignorance, fear, and limited liability patriotism. Defense contractors and assorted beltway bandits defend it out of greed. Politicians support it out of fear, greed and ambition. Veterans support it out of genuine patriotism, pride, and a loyalty to their service. I would suggest that veterans take a close, objective, look at their support of Pentagon spending.
In a nation that projects trillion dollar budgets over the next several years, how do you justify $7 million per year to sponsor a car on the NASCAR circuit? How do you justify more than $27 million per year to fund the DOD Senior Mentors program (AKA ”careerism on steroids”), which pays retired three and four stars $440 per hour up to $179,000 per year while receiving their full retirement benefits and being on the payroll of a defense contractor? How do you justify the fact that the U.S. defense budget is larger than the defense budgets of the next ten countries combined? How do you rationalize the fact that we are spending $6 billion per month in Afghanistan while we allocate $4.3 billion over four years to fund the Race to the Top, the U.S. government’s signature program to fix the nation’s broken public education system?
My difficulty in answering the questions above turns toward embarrassment as a veteran in light of the fact that the Defense Department is the only major federal government agency whose books are in such disarray that it cannot stand a financial audit. I am not talking about passing the audit; just undergoing one. DOD officials had committed to being able to undergo the audit by fiscal year 2000 but now say it will be 8-10 years before they will be able to do so. DOD officials cannot tell government auditors where more than $700 billion is spent each year. David M. Walker, former comptroller general of the United States has said, “I came to the conclusion that we have built the best fighting forces in the world at a very high cost and with a huge amount of waste. And the nation’s defense strategy is not as comprehensive, integrated, and future focused as it needs to be.”
There is much good that comes from a strong national defense. Informed, objective, patriotic, veterans must take the lead in imposing national thought, discipline and accountability into defense spending. Otherwise, greed, fear, ambition and limited liability patriotism will prevail in weakening national defenses.
In a nation that projects trillion dollar budgets over the next several years, how do you justify $7 million per year to sponsor a car on the NASCAR circuit? How do you justify more than $27 million per year to fund the DOD Senior Mentors program (AKA ”careerism on steroids”), which pays retired three and four stars $440 per hour up to $179,000 per year while receiving their full retirement benefits and being on the payroll of a defense contractor? How do you justify the fact that the U.S. defense budget is larger than the defense budgets of the next ten countries combined? How do you rationalize the fact that we are spending $6 billion per month in Afghanistan while we allocate $4.3 billion over four years to fund the Race to the Top, the U.S. government’s signature program to fix the nation’s broken public education system?
My difficulty in answering the questions above turns toward embarrassment as a veteran in light of the fact that the Defense Department is the only major federal government agency whose books are in such disarray that it cannot stand a financial audit. I am not talking about passing the audit; just undergoing one. DOD officials had committed to being able to undergo the audit by fiscal year 2000 but now say it will be 8-10 years before they will be able to do so. DOD officials cannot tell government auditors where more than $700 billion is spent each year. David M. Walker, former comptroller general of the United States has said, “I came to the conclusion that we have built the best fighting forces in the world at a very high cost and with a huge amount of waste. And the nation’s defense strategy is not as comprehensive, integrated, and future focused as it needs to be.”
There is much good that comes from a strong national defense. Informed, objective, patriotic, veterans must take the lead in imposing national thought, discipline and accountability into defense spending. Otherwise, greed, fear, ambition and limited liability patriotism will prevail in weakening national defenses.
Thursday, February 17, 2011
Lessons From Egypt
Recent events in Egypt are indeed historic. They can be viewed through a host of lenses. Among them; the Egyptian people, President Mubarak, the Egyptian military, autocratic rulers in the Middle East and their citizens, terrorist groups like Al Qaida and the Muslim Brotherhood and Western governments. I will focus here on the lens through which the United States government and its national security apparatus has viewed the events at a strategic level and what its implications might be in the future.
First, the events over these eighteen days showcased the clash between U.S. interests and espoused ideals. We attempted to straddle the fence between supporting the justified aspirations of millions of suppressed Egyptians and our own interests in the stability of a long time ally in the region. We knew that whatever position we took had secondary effects in other allied countries in the region led by dictators of suppressed populations. Ideals won out in the end, driven by events fortuitous for the U.S. but we lost some moral authority in the process. It is interesting that the Bush Administration’s “freedom and democracy” agenda in the Middle East is playing out but with a strategy and driving force they never considered. In both Iraq and Egypt dictators were toppled with two differences, one, we liked one of the two dictators and two, one of the actions did not cost the U.S. anything in blood or treasure. And as to final outcomes in the two, I would suggest that Iran is more likely to dominate Iraq’s future policies than the Muslim Brotherhood is to dominate Egyptian politics.
Second, these events illustrate a model or theory of these democratization processes. These types of events fall on a continuum from aspiration, to persuasion, to coercion. The American Revolutions, the Solidarity Movement in Poland, and now the Tunisian and Egyptian movement fall into the aspiration category. Energy and determination came from the people. Persuasion is the least often experienced of the three, but may have been dominant in South Africa and Northern Ireland in our lifetimes. Finally, we have democracy through coercion, best exemplified in Iraq and Afghanistan where the U.S. continues to spend blood and treasure, democracy is foreign, and strong internal cultural, ethnic, and historic forces work against it. Clearly, democracy generated from the aspiration end of the continuum is preferable.
A final observation at the strategic level regards the effect these events may have on the “global war on terrorism” that the U.S. has been fighting for almost ten years at a cost of almost 6,000 lives and two trillion dollars to this point. Al Qaida has identified the overthrow of Mubarak as a primary goal since at least 1996. He has been overthrown and there is no hint of Al Qaida influences or involvement. Tunisia has gone the same route and several other Middle East dictators have taken steps to eliminate or reduce the grievances that Al Qaida has used to justify its movement and motivate its adherents. These aspiration and persuasive democracy movements reduce the market for what Al Qaida has to sell and reduced its effectiveness and brand. Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian issue, and overall U.S. Middle East policy are still potential rally cries for Al Qaida but its market for mayhem has contracted greatly. It remains to be seen whether America can take advantage of these developments in its “war on terrorism.” Watch closely.
First, the events over these eighteen days showcased the clash between U.S. interests and espoused ideals. We attempted to straddle the fence between supporting the justified aspirations of millions of suppressed Egyptians and our own interests in the stability of a long time ally in the region. We knew that whatever position we took had secondary effects in other allied countries in the region led by dictators of suppressed populations. Ideals won out in the end, driven by events fortuitous for the U.S. but we lost some moral authority in the process. It is interesting that the Bush Administration’s “freedom and democracy” agenda in the Middle East is playing out but with a strategy and driving force they never considered. In both Iraq and Egypt dictators were toppled with two differences, one, we liked one of the two dictators and two, one of the actions did not cost the U.S. anything in blood or treasure. And as to final outcomes in the two, I would suggest that Iran is more likely to dominate Iraq’s future policies than the Muslim Brotherhood is to dominate Egyptian politics.
Second, these events illustrate a model or theory of these democratization processes. These types of events fall on a continuum from aspiration, to persuasion, to coercion. The American Revolutions, the Solidarity Movement in Poland, and now the Tunisian and Egyptian movement fall into the aspiration category. Energy and determination came from the people. Persuasion is the least often experienced of the three, but may have been dominant in South Africa and Northern Ireland in our lifetimes. Finally, we have democracy through coercion, best exemplified in Iraq and Afghanistan where the U.S. continues to spend blood and treasure, democracy is foreign, and strong internal cultural, ethnic, and historic forces work against it. Clearly, democracy generated from the aspiration end of the continuum is preferable.
A final observation at the strategic level regards the effect these events may have on the “global war on terrorism” that the U.S. has been fighting for almost ten years at a cost of almost 6,000 lives and two trillion dollars to this point. Al Qaida has identified the overthrow of Mubarak as a primary goal since at least 1996. He has been overthrown and there is no hint of Al Qaida influences or involvement. Tunisia has gone the same route and several other Middle East dictators have taken steps to eliminate or reduce the grievances that Al Qaida has used to justify its movement and motivate its adherents. These aspiration and persuasive democracy movements reduce the market for what Al Qaida has to sell and reduced its effectiveness and brand. Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian issue, and overall U.S. Middle East policy are still potential rally cries for Al Qaida but its market for mayhem has contracted greatly. It remains to be seen whether America can take advantage of these developments in its “war on terrorism.” Watch closely.
Thursday, February 10, 2011
Our Heads In The Sand
Last week I was in Washington D.C. and had the opportunity to hear James Woolsey, former CIA Director, deliver a speech to a selected military audience. I have heard dozens of speeches by people with his background; all smart, articulate, and well informed. Woolsey brought these unique features to his speech…passion and candor. Usually these guys are dull and politically correct.
His theme was to ask and answer the question “What is the most important thing that the United States could do to enhance its national security?” You might expect him to propose things like improve our intelligence capability, to spend more on the military, or win the war on terrorism. But he did not. He laid out a compelling case that the most important single thing that we can do to enhance national security is to dramatically reduce our dependencies on foreign oil and become energy independent…period. In closing, he pointed out that since 1973 (the OPEC oil embargo) when we first became aware of this vulnerability and its adverse consequences we have become even more dependent on foreign oil and have no national energy strategy to address the crisis. Denial, delusion, and self indulgences are hallmarks of disaster.
His theme was to ask and answer the question “What is the most important thing that the United States could do to enhance its national security?” You might expect him to propose things like improve our intelligence capability, to spend more on the military, or win the war on terrorism. But he did not. He laid out a compelling case that the most important single thing that we can do to enhance national security is to dramatically reduce our dependencies on foreign oil and become energy independent…period. In closing, he pointed out that since 1973 (the OPEC oil embargo) when we first became aware of this vulnerability and its adverse consequences we have become even more dependent on foreign oil and have no national energy strategy to address the crisis. Denial, delusion, and self indulgences are hallmarks of disaster.
Monday, January 24, 2011
Terrorism, Cyber War, or Defense?
On Sunday, January 16, 2011 the New York Times reported at length on the sabotage of equipment critical to the advancement of Iran’s nuclear program. The sabotage was executed through the placement of a “worm” called Stuxnet into the computer programs that control centrifuges to enrich uranium. The article places responsibility for the placement of the “worm” with Israel and the United States with cooperation from Germany. The Israeli and American governments neither admit nor deny that they were responsible. Most Western and Middle Eastern governments applaud the sabotage of the centrifuges.
The facts outlined above beg a question which the New York Times does not address. Was this an act of terrorism directed toward Iran? Was this a first battle in a cyber war against Iran? And, more importantly, will Iran react in-kind against a heavily computer dependent, relatively unprotected American financial, interpersonal, and communication network infrastructure? If Iran succeeded in doing the same to us would we consider it terrorism or cyber warfare?
The facts outlined above beg a question which the New York Times does not address. Was this an act of terrorism directed toward Iran? Was this a first battle in a cyber war against Iran? And, more importantly, will Iran react in-kind against a heavily computer dependent, relatively unprotected American financial, interpersonal, and communication network infrastructure? If Iran succeeded in doing the same to us would we consider it terrorism or cyber warfare?
Friday, January 7, 2011
Institutional Hypocrisy
It is clear that most Americans were disappointed at best and shocked at worst at the videos by Captain Owen Honors, until recently the commanding officer of the U.S.S. Enterprise. The Navy acted quickly this week to relieve him of command and launch an investigation, dealing with the issue at one level.
But questions remain at a deeper level. Some of his supervisors were aware of the offensive videos in 2006 or 2007 and complaints were filed by some sailors in that time frame. Nonetheless, the Navy promoted him and assigned him as the Enterprise commanding officer. But it wasn’t until the issue became public knowledge last week that the institutional Navy sanctimoniously reacted and disciplined Captain Honors.
So which set of cultural norms and standards of discipline and conduct does the institutional Navy adhere to? Why were complaints about the contents of the videos by some offended crew members (as acknowledged on film by Captain Honors) not pursued by those in charge? Where were the Chaplains, JAGs, and Equal Opportunity Officers on board? Does this flip flop of reactions by the Navy indicate a clear disconnect in values between the U.S. military and the people of the nation it protects and serves. Finally, and most fundamentally, does the Navy condone this type of behavior by its “leaders” unless it becomes public knowledge?
But questions remain at a deeper level. Some of his supervisors were aware of the offensive videos in 2006 or 2007 and complaints were filed by some sailors in that time frame. Nonetheless, the Navy promoted him and assigned him as the Enterprise commanding officer. But it wasn’t until the issue became public knowledge last week that the institutional Navy sanctimoniously reacted and disciplined Captain Honors.
So which set of cultural norms and standards of discipline and conduct does the institutional Navy adhere to? Why were complaints about the contents of the videos by some offended crew members (as acknowledged on film by Captain Honors) not pursued by those in charge? Where were the Chaplains, JAGs, and Equal Opportunity Officers on board? Does this flip flop of reactions by the Navy indicate a clear disconnect in values between the U.S. military and the people of the nation it protects and serves. Finally, and most fundamentally, does the Navy condone this type of behavior by its “leaders” unless it becomes public knowledge?
Tuesday, January 4, 2011
Remember Osama Bin Laden?
As the 112th Congress convenes in Washington D.C. in January it will consider a number of issues. Among them will be a defense budget of $720 billion plus and a total intelligence budget of a similar amount (the total intelligence budget is classified). The defense budget is greater than the defense budget of the next ten nations in the world combined. Historically, there are few first order questions asked by the members of the house and senate armed services committees or the press regarding those budgets and the pentagon, the defense contractors, and lobbyists usually get what they want absent the first order questions.
Although I would not consider it a first order question, one question that has not been raised recently in a rigorous manner is “Why have you failed to kill or capture Osama Bin Laden? “ The man is 6’6” tall, his photo is splashed around the world, he is on kidney dialysis, there is a reward of $27 million for his capture, and he sends out videos periodically taunting us. How can a “defense/intelligence” establishment explain this failure and what does it tell us about the effectiveness of this establishment after ten years and the level of support other governments in the “war on terror.”
To this point, talking heads at the Pentagon and CIA have recently told us that Bin Laden’s elimination is not important in the “war on terror.” But rest assured of this, if he is killed or captured, these same talking heads will tout it as one of the great national security accomplishments of our time and perhaps roll out a large “Mission Accomplished” banner. In the meantime it’s not important, just keep writing all the checks.
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