Doubly Dumb

Several years ago I was visiting the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks and my host invited me to have lunch with a war college student who was a senior officer in the Mexican military. He laid out the status of the Mexican drug war at the time. Then, the drug war in Mexico was nowhere “on my radar.” Since then I have followed it closely as it has become more intense and far reaching and U.S. civilian law enforcement and military have become more involved on both sides of the border. The U.S. press has also expanded its coverage. The effects of these drug wars in Mexico on overall violent deaths, official corruption, reluctance to invest, and civilian and military enforcements costs have been huge and are growing. Mexico is at the brink of being a failed narco state on our shared southern border of almost 2,000 miles; a compelling threat to our national security. To allow this to happen when there is a partial solution available to the U.S. would be dumb. If this same solution to the Mexican drug crisis would also help solve the U.S. budget deficit problem and we didn’t do it would also be dumb. Thus you have doubly dumb.

The action I allude to above is to legalize marijuana in the United States thus weakening the drug cartels by taking this revenue stream and tax marijuana in the U.S. as we do alcohol and tobacco; two equally pernicious but socially acceptable and heavily taxed vices. I am not suggesting that marijuana is “good” or “helpful.” I am suggesting that there are two good reasons for taking this action that substitutes being pragmatic and smart for being doubly dumb and hypocritical.

Arab Spring-Israeli Winter

The Middle East appears to be going through two seasons at the same time. On one hand we have the Arab Spring where citizens have risen up, or are rising up to challenge dictators and repressive governments in the name of democracy, freedom, transparency and dignity. The movement has generally been supported by Western nations including the United States even though the movements ultimate outcomes or, in many cases, its leaders are unknown. On the other hand, we see an Israeli Winter, where Israel is becoming increasingly isolated in the Middle East and, as a result, increasingly paranoid (which some may argue is justified).

This paranoia has lead to an alarming development in Israeli politics and public opinion. Recent reports in the Israeli press indicate the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak are working to convince other member of the cabinet and Israeli security officials that Israel must launch a preemptive strike on Iran‘s nuclear program. Israel has taken such actions in the past. In 1981, Israeli aircraft bombed an unfinished nuclear reactor in Iraq, destroying that country’s nuclear program. And in 2007 Israeli warplanes destroyed a site in Syria that the U.N. nuclear watchdog deemed a secretly built nuclear reactor. Neither country retaliated against these acts of aggression. As to public opinion., the Dialog polling institute recently reported that 41% of the Israeli public said they would support an attack and 37% would oppose an attack (with a 4.6% margin of error).

I believe it is wishful thinking to believe that Iran would not respond militarily to an Israeli attack and that the exchange might not lead to a wider war, perhaps involving most, if not all, of the Middle East. If this were to occur, there is no reason to believe that the U.S. would not be drawn into the war. Given the current readiness of the U.S. military after ten years of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, the state of the world economy, and the current U.S. budget deficit and debt, a total war in the Middle East is the last thing America can afford…in terms of blood and treasure. Someone at the White House should call Prime Minister Netanyahu and tell him in the most unambiguous terms as possible that attacking Iran’s suspected nuclear sites is not acceptable and if he chooses to do so nevertheless he and his country are on their own in dealing with the consequences. The U.S. can no longer afford to be a dog being wagged by its tail.

Leaving Iraq

I am constantly aware of the danger of crossing over from skeptic to cynic as an observer of American national security affairs. Nevertheless I am astonished by the reaction last week to President Obama’s announcement that U.S. troops will leave Iraq after eight years of war, over 4,400 U.S. lives, and more than a trillion dollars spent. My astonishment exists at the political, the strategic and the individual level.

Political opponents of President Obama such as Mitt Romney, Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham and others are criticizing him for executing a status of force agreement negotiated by George W. Bush, who the last I looked, is a fellow Republican. Bush negotiated this agreement before leaving office and Obama never repudiated it. In fact Obama is doing exactly what many Americans say they would like to have elected officials do; fulfill campaign promises. Candidate Obama said he would get us out of Iraq in a first term and never compromised that promise. (I, too, wish he had delivered on some others).

Strategically, some people believe and would like to have others believe that the U.S. now has and will have more influence in Iraq than Iran has. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said recently on Meet the Press, “No one should miscalculate America’s resolve and commitment to helping support the Iraqi democracy” and “We have paid too high a price to give Iraqis the chance. And I hope that Iran and no one else miscalculate that.” The fact is that Iran and Iraq are closely aligned by geography, religion, language, trade and a debt owed to Iran by current Iraqi leaders who lived in exile in Iran during Saddam Hussein’s rule. Muctada al Sadar, a radical cleric who is an Iranian proxy, is the power broker who kept the head of Iraq, Nuri al Maliki, in place. Furthermore the rational for keeping a U.S. military presence in Iraq, protecting Iraqi airspace, stabilizing its borders, and being an intelligence resource do not pass any rational test of demonstrated U.S. capability or intent.

Finally, I have had a number of conversations with my friends, neighbors and acquaintances who feel strongly that the withdrawal is a mistake. The irony of their position is that it not only lacks facts but more importantly the lack of commitment or investment. None of them served in the military and none of them have children or grandchildren who are serving in the military. So when I ask them if they are willing to pay a quarterly war tax to finance the Iraq war or have their children and/or grandchildren drafted to serve in Iraq, all say NO thus identifying themselves a chicken hawks at worst or uninformed limited liability patriots at best.

Failure

One thing that every U.S. official, military and civilian, who has responsibility for Afghanistan agrees upon is that the eradication of the poppy crop in Afghanistan is critical to defeating the Taliban and establishing some form of stable, democratic, central government there. The United Nations drug control agency reported earlier this week that the amount of land sown with poppies increased by 7% this year. It was the second consecutive year that poppy cultivation rose. This rise has occurred despite hundreds of millions of dollars spent by the U.S. government to disrupt opium smuggling operations and the insurgent networks that profit from them.

Afghan economic realities trump American aspirations and “magical thinking”. We are trying to convince Afghan farmers who have cultivated poppies for generations to grow wheat, pomegranates and saffron instead of poppies which can yield more than $4000 per acre. Do the math. What would you grow? Because of rising prices and higher production the value of the opium produced in Afghanistan is set to more than double this year to $1.4 billion equal to 9% of Afghanistan’s GDP and approximately equal to the government’s annual tax revenues. The majority of that $1.4 billion will flow to the Taliban and Afghan warlords.

After several years of asking the question, “What does success (winning) in Afghanistan look like?” without anything resembling a good answer, I may be a step closer by identifying failure.

"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" is officially over!

http://my.barackobama.com/DADT-Is-History

Click on the link above to see my interview regarding "Don't Ask, Don't Tell."

Difficult Questions

Late last week I made what may have been a mistake over a cup of coffee by asking a Palestinian friend of mine what he thought of the attacks on the U.S. embassy and NATO headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan earlier in the week (13 September). He quickly told me that he was not supportive of the attacks and was deeply concerned with the ongoing Middle East violence. He said that he was also concerned about American actions in the area and reporting in the American press and asked me three questions along those lines.

First, he asked why it is that when we “take out” a Taliban or Al Qaida leader we say we weaken these organizations but we systematically take out our own leaders when we rotate units and leaders back to the U.S. and do not acknowledge any degradation of effectiveness in the war zone. Second, he asked why the U.S. press and pentagon characterize the successful attacks last week as an indication that Afghan forces are unable to provide for their own defense without U.S. help and ignore the fact that they were unable to do so WITH U.S. help. Might the U.S. presence as an occupying force motivate the attacks? Finally, he found Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s characterization of the action of suicide bombers in the attack as “cowardly” ironic. He asked if this characterization implied that firing a missile from a drone from 7000 miles away was any more heroic. He then offered me a “bonus” question and asked why it was that the U.S. supported the “Arab Spring” in Tunisia, Libya, Syria and Egypt but not in Bahrain, the West Bank or Gaza.

I did not have good answers to any of these troubling questions. The only consolation from the conversation was that he bought the coffee.

Insecurity Through Obesity

I know that this is a blog focused on national security and military affairs so you may be asking what obesity has to do with national security…read on. National security has many sources in addition to military capabilities. Among the additional sources are diplomacy, education, intellectual property, culture and economic strength. Last year all of Washington was engaged in the health care debate but not one elected or appointed officer or pundit pointed out that fully one third of the American people were clinically obese. Obesity leads to diabetes, heart disease, and respiratory ailments, some forms of cancer and skeletal infirmities, all of which contribute to the 17% plus of GDP we spend on health care in America. Some analysts have said that eliminating obesity in America would reduce health care expenses by 3-4% of GDP, a bigger reduction than all the elements of the legislation that ultimately passed Congress. Yet no one said a word about obesity.

Obviously, obesity affects national security because its cost weakens us economically. Devoting 3-4% of GDP to obesity related health care costs takes money away from education, infrastructure, and research initiatives that strengthen the economy. It also takes money away from military budgets as the Pentagon competes for dollars in a resources scarce environment. This tradeoff is also seen within the defense establishment as the Veteran’s Administration mission is made more complex and expensive as they treat patients who have not only service related injuries and illnesses but also obesity related conditions. Treating our Agent Orange victims is less complicated and more successful if the victim is not obese.

In the future, the American trend toward obesity among our young people will impact the ability to man the All Volunteer Force. More and more potential recruits will be unable to meet minimum height / weight standards for induction, causing the military to lower standards, raise enlistment bonuses, reduce the size of the force or take some other measure in response to the effect obesity will have on recruiting and manning the force.