In my last blog posting I asked the question “Did we win?” in Iraq. The relevance of the question is that it informs our ongoing involvement in Afghanistan. The “Part II” question is “Did we win in Libya?” The stated mission was to protect civilian lives and remove Kaddafi. Both were accomplished at virtually no cost to the U.S. treasury, no U.S. service member’s lives lost and no cry from the international community to spend a trillion dollars to rebuild Libya. President Obama was criticized for leading from behind and allowing NATO to do the heavy lifting. Leading from behind looks pretty smart.
The relevance of asking this question regarding Libya is that today some are calling for the U.S. to intervene in Syria to protect civilians and oust an autocrat…sound familiar? I would suggest that what we learned about winning through our experiences in Iraq and Libya should be used to inform our decision regarding Syria.
Wednesday, February 22, 2012
Thursday, February 16, 2012
Did We Win?
We Americans are a fundamentally competitive people. Part of that competitive culture is the concept of winning and losing. We ask, “Who won?” regarding everything from Little League games to legal battles and Super Bowls to presidential primaries. This national competitive spirit has served us well and produced great achievements in commerce, diplomacy, national security, and athletics and contributed to the belief in American exceptionalism.
Given this strong belief in competition and its byproduct of winning and losing and our recent withdrawal from Iraq after nine years of war at a cost of more than 4500 American lives and $2 trillion, I find it interesting that no one is asking whether or stating that we won…or lost. No officials in the Obama administration, no Republican presidential candidate, no talking head on television and no newspaper editorial writer has broached the question or offered and answer. If we did win, what did we win and was it worth the cost? I will not bias your answer to this question. “Did we win?” by offering mine, but I will state that I feel strongly that there were four clear winners in Iraq: China, Iran, the Iraqi Shehites, and Halliburton/Blackwater.
One might ask why it is important to engage the question of winning and losing in Iraq. The war is over for the US and our troops have left the country. The importance lays in the fact that we are still choosing to engage in a war in Afghanistan that is costing us $2 billion per week and generating American causalities every month as a result of commitment that is to last through 2014. Between now and 2014 we expect to lose hundreds of American lives and spend a quarter of a trillion dollars (borrowed from the Chinese and others) in Afghanistan. Many of the same questions regarding ends, ways and means that would frame the question of winning and losing in Iraq apply to Afghanistan. The difference is that Iraq is over and Afghanistan rages on. By declining to engage the question of winning or losing in Iraq, we forego the learning it might provide regarding Afghanistan. Perhaps that’s what we want since it’s a tough, potentially embarrassing question. We take this easy road though at the cost of US lives and treasure and create a new set of winners: Pakistan, the Taliban, a corrupt Afghan government supported by the U.S. and of course, Halliburton. If we ask today what a war in 2014 in Afghanistan would look like we should ask if its worth hundreds of American lives and a quarter of a trillion dollars today…in 2014 it’s too late.
Given this strong belief in competition and its byproduct of winning and losing and our recent withdrawal from Iraq after nine years of war at a cost of more than 4500 American lives and $2 trillion, I find it interesting that no one is asking whether or stating that we won…or lost. No officials in the Obama administration, no Republican presidential candidate, no talking head on television and no newspaper editorial writer has broached the question or offered and answer. If we did win, what did we win and was it worth the cost? I will not bias your answer to this question. “Did we win?” by offering mine, but I will state that I feel strongly that there were four clear winners in Iraq: China, Iran, the Iraqi Shehites, and Halliburton/Blackwater.
One might ask why it is important to engage the question of winning and losing in Iraq. The war is over for the US and our troops have left the country. The importance lays in the fact that we are still choosing to engage in a war in Afghanistan that is costing us $2 billion per week and generating American causalities every month as a result of commitment that is to last through 2014. Between now and 2014 we expect to lose hundreds of American lives and spend a quarter of a trillion dollars (borrowed from the Chinese and others) in Afghanistan. Many of the same questions regarding ends, ways and means that would frame the question of winning and losing in Iraq apply to Afghanistan. The difference is that Iraq is over and Afghanistan rages on. By declining to engage the question of winning or losing in Iraq, we forego the learning it might provide regarding Afghanistan. Perhaps that’s what we want since it’s a tough, potentially embarrassing question. We take this easy road though at the cost of US lives and treasure and create a new set of winners: Pakistan, the Taliban, a corrupt Afghan government supported by the U.S. and of course, Halliburton. If we ask today what a war in 2014 in Afghanistan would look like we should ask if its worth hundreds of American lives and a quarter of a trillion dollars today…in 2014 it’s too late.
Friday, January 20, 2012
Credibility Suffers in Face of DADT Warnings
The following Op Ed by Major General Laich appeared in the January 23 issue of Army Times.
It has now been almost four months since “don’t ask, don’t tell” was formally repealed on September 20. Four months does not make a history, but none of the catastrophic consequences of repeal predicted by its opponents has come to pass. There have been no mass resignations from the military, no barracks or shipboard riots, no mass gay rights demonstrations on military installations, no massive declines in enlistment or re-enlistment rates, and no declines in morale, discipline and cohesion. Repeal has been the nonevent its advocates predicted that it would be.
Some of the most vocal among repeal’s opponents were many of the military’s “senior leaders” charged with providing the commander in chief, Congress and the American people with their best military advice. The fact is these “senior leaders” were wrong. Whether they were wrong due to their personal biases, pandering to a conservative/evangelical base, or simply out of touch with the service members they are privileged to serve, they were wrong.
The young troops have proved themselves to be more mature, pragmatic and professional than their “senior leaders” projected them to be and, more alarmingly, than the “senior leaders” themselves (with the exception of Admirals (Mike) Mullen and (Robert) Papp). This is an alarming failure that should bring into question the judgment and perhaps the integrity of those “senior leaders” who advocated against repeal.
Many of these same “senior leaders” were perfectly willing, in response to recruiting shortfall in the 2004-2008 time frame, to lower enlistment standards while discharging trained service members under DADT. During that time frame, the Army raised the maximum age for enlistment, lowered the education and physical standards, and granted an all-time high number of moral waivers.
The net effect of these policy positions is that these “senior leaders” would rather man the force with middle-aged, unfit, undereducated felons than with young, fit, educated soldiers with clean police records, simply because of the latter group’s sexual orientation. The policy cost the military the contributions of more than 14,000 fully trained, qualified and, in many cases, combat-experience service members: a cost measured in tax-payer dollars, combat capability and military credibility.
Given the fact that these “senior leaders” appear to have been so wrong and the cost so high, a congressional inquiry, or at least a rigorous after-action review (with the results made public) would be appropriate. If neither is done, one might ask why we should accept the best military advice of these “senior leaders” on future tough issues. Credibility is earned by performance, not conferred by position.
It has now been almost four months since “don’t ask, don’t tell” was formally repealed on September 20. Four months does not make a history, but none of the catastrophic consequences of repeal predicted by its opponents has come to pass. There have been no mass resignations from the military, no barracks or shipboard riots, no mass gay rights demonstrations on military installations, no massive declines in enlistment or re-enlistment rates, and no declines in morale, discipline and cohesion. Repeal has been the nonevent its advocates predicted that it would be.
Some of the most vocal among repeal’s opponents were many of the military’s “senior leaders” charged with providing the commander in chief, Congress and the American people with their best military advice. The fact is these “senior leaders” were wrong. Whether they were wrong due to their personal biases, pandering to a conservative/evangelical base, or simply out of touch with the service members they are privileged to serve, they were wrong.
The young troops have proved themselves to be more mature, pragmatic and professional than their “senior leaders” projected them to be and, more alarmingly, than the “senior leaders” themselves (with the exception of Admirals (Mike) Mullen and (Robert) Papp). This is an alarming failure that should bring into question the judgment and perhaps the integrity of those “senior leaders” who advocated against repeal.
Many of these same “senior leaders” were perfectly willing, in response to recruiting shortfall in the 2004-2008 time frame, to lower enlistment standards while discharging trained service members under DADT. During that time frame, the Army raised the maximum age for enlistment, lowered the education and physical standards, and granted an all-time high number of moral waivers.
The net effect of these policy positions is that these “senior leaders” would rather man the force with middle-aged, unfit, undereducated felons than with young, fit, educated soldiers with clean police records, simply because of the latter group’s sexual orientation. The policy cost the military the contributions of more than 14,000 fully trained, qualified and, in many cases, combat-experience service members: a cost measured in tax-payer dollars, combat capability and military credibility.
Given the fact that these “senior leaders” appear to have been so wrong and the cost so high, a congressional inquiry, or at least a rigorous after-action review (with the results made public) would be appropriate. If neither is done, one might ask why we should accept the best military advice of these “senior leaders” on future tough issues. Credibility is earned by performance, not conferred by position.
Wednesday, January 4, 2012
U.S Would Regret Conflict with Iran
The letter to the editor by Major General Laich that follows was published in the January 3, 2012 edition of the Columbus Dispatch.
I was alarmed by last Tuesday’s letter “U.S. need not fear Iranian threat to Israel” from Austin Reid. It reminded me of the assurances given to the American people prior to the U.S. Invasion of Iraq that the war would be brief, we would be greeted as liberators and Iraqi oil would pay for the war. $2 trillion and 4,400 American lives later we know that this was magical thinking and that the enemy has a vote.
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, a realist not enrolled in the magical-thinking school, said earlier this month that an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities could “consume the Middle East in a confrontation and a conflict that we would regret.”
Reid wrote that “in the aftermath of an Israeli attack, Iran more than likely would respond as did Iraq and Syria and not retaliate” if Israel attacked its nuclear sites. Panetta, a host of national security experts and I disagree.
The conflict that would result would draw in the United States, based on its treaties with Israel; raise oil prices, leading to a double-dip U.S. recession; and unleash terrorist attacks by Iran’s proxies against U.S. targets worldwide, to include the U.S. homeland.
Unlike the Iraqi and Syrian targets Reid refers to having been successfully engaged by Israel in the past, the Iranian nuclear sites are dispersed, dug in and protected by anti-aircraft defenses, thus making an equally successful attack far less likely. Additionally, Israel would have to secure the permission of the Iraqi government to overfly its airspace or violate the airspace and Iraq’s sovereignty, which the United States is committed to protect.
Reid has his history correct, but the military and national security references he draws from it reflect magical thinking.
I was alarmed by last Tuesday’s letter “U.S. need not fear Iranian threat to Israel” from Austin Reid. It reminded me of the assurances given to the American people prior to the U.S. Invasion of Iraq that the war would be brief, we would be greeted as liberators and Iraqi oil would pay for the war. $2 trillion and 4,400 American lives later we know that this was magical thinking and that the enemy has a vote.
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, a realist not enrolled in the magical-thinking school, said earlier this month that an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities could “consume the Middle East in a confrontation and a conflict that we would regret.”
Reid wrote that “in the aftermath of an Israeli attack, Iran more than likely would respond as did Iraq and Syria and not retaliate” if Israel attacked its nuclear sites. Panetta, a host of national security experts and I disagree.
The conflict that would result would draw in the United States, based on its treaties with Israel; raise oil prices, leading to a double-dip U.S. recession; and unleash terrorist attacks by Iran’s proxies against U.S. targets worldwide, to include the U.S. homeland.
Unlike the Iraqi and Syrian targets Reid refers to having been successfully engaged by Israel in the past, the Iranian nuclear sites are dispersed, dug in and protected by anti-aircraft defenses, thus making an equally successful attack far less likely. Additionally, Israel would have to secure the permission of the Iraqi government to overfly its airspace or violate the airspace and Iraq’s sovereignty, which the United States is committed to protect.
Reid has his history correct, but the military and national security references he draws from it reflect magical thinking.
Monday, December 12, 2011
Doubly Dumb
Several years ago I was visiting the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks and my host invited me to have lunch with a war college student who was a senior officer in the Mexican military. He laid out the status of the Mexican drug war at the time. Then, the drug war in Mexico was nowhere “on my radar.” Since then I have followed it closely as it has become more intense and far reaching and U.S. civilian law enforcement and military have become more involved on both sides of the border. The U.S. press has also expanded its coverage. The effects of these drug wars in Mexico on overall violent deaths, official corruption, reluctance to invest, and civilian and military enforcements costs have been huge and are growing. Mexico is at the brink of being a failed narco state on our shared southern border of almost 2,000 miles; a compelling threat to our national security. To allow this to happen when there is a partial solution available to the U.S. would be dumb. If this same solution to the Mexican drug crisis would also help solve the U.S. budget deficit problem and we didn’t do it would also be dumb. Thus you have doubly dumb.
The action I allude to above is to legalize marijuana in the United States thus weakening the drug cartels by taking this revenue stream and tax marijuana in the U.S. as we do alcohol and tobacco; two equally pernicious but socially acceptable and heavily taxed vices. I am not suggesting that marijuana is “good” or “helpful.” I am suggesting that there are two good reasons for taking this action that substitutes being pragmatic and smart for being doubly dumb and hypocritical.
The action I allude to above is to legalize marijuana in the United States thus weakening the drug cartels by taking this revenue stream and tax marijuana in the U.S. as we do alcohol and tobacco; two equally pernicious but socially acceptable and heavily taxed vices. I am not suggesting that marijuana is “good” or “helpful.” I am suggesting that there are two good reasons for taking this action that substitutes being pragmatic and smart for being doubly dumb and hypocritical.
Monday, November 7, 2011
Arab Spring-Israeli Winter
The Middle East appears to be going through two seasons at the same time. On one hand we have the Arab Spring where citizens have risen up, or are rising up to challenge dictators and repressive governments in the name of democracy, freedom, transparency and dignity. The movement has generally been supported by Western nations including the United States even though the movements ultimate outcomes or, in many cases, its leaders are unknown. On the other hand, we see an Israeli Winter, where Israel is becoming increasingly isolated in the Middle East and, as a result, increasingly paranoid (which some may argue is justified).
This paranoia has lead to an alarming development in Israeli politics and public opinion. Recent reports in the Israeli press indicate the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak are working to convince other member of the cabinet and Israeli security officials that Israel must launch a preemptive strike on Iran‘s nuclear program. Israel has taken such actions in the past. In 1981, Israeli aircraft bombed an unfinished nuclear reactor in Iraq, destroying that country’s nuclear program. And in 2007 Israeli warplanes destroyed a site in Syria that the U.N. nuclear watchdog deemed a secretly built nuclear reactor. Neither country retaliated against these acts of aggression. As to public opinion., the Dialog polling institute recently reported that 41% of the Israeli public said they would support an attack and 37% would oppose an attack (with a 4.6% margin of error).
I believe it is wishful thinking to believe that Iran would not respond militarily to an Israeli attack and that the exchange might not lead to a wider war, perhaps involving most, if not all, of the Middle East. If this were to occur, there is no reason to believe that the U.S. would not be drawn into the war. Given the current readiness of the U.S. military after ten years of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, the state of the world economy, and the current U.S. budget deficit and debt, a total war in the Middle East is the last thing America can afford…in terms of blood and treasure. Someone at the White House should call Prime Minister Netanyahu and tell him in the most unambiguous terms as possible that attacking Iran’s suspected nuclear sites is not acceptable and if he chooses to do so nevertheless he and his country are on their own in dealing with the consequences. The U.S. can no longer afford to be a dog being wagged by its tail.
This paranoia has lead to an alarming development in Israeli politics and public opinion. Recent reports in the Israeli press indicate the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak are working to convince other member of the cabinet and Israeli security officials that Israel must launch a preemptive strike on Iran‘s nuclear program. Israel has taken such actions in the past. In 1981, Israeli aircraft bombed an unfinished nuclear reactor in Iraq, destroying that country’s nuclear program. And in 2007 Israeli warplanes destroyed a site in Syria that the U.N. nuclear watchdog deemed a secretly built nuclear reactor. Neither country retaliated against these acts of aggression. As to public opinion., the Dialog polling institute recently reported that 41% of the Israeli public said they would support an attack and 37% would oppose an attack (with a 4.6% margin of error).
I believe it is wishful thinking to believe that Iran would not respond militarily to an Israeli attack and that the exchange might not lead to a wider war, perhaps involving most, if not all, of the Middle East. If this were to occur, there is no reason to believe that the U.S. would not be drawn into the war. Given the current readiness of the U.S. military after ten years of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, the state of the world economy, and the current U.S. budget deficit and debt, a total war in the Middle East is the last thing America can afford…in terms of blood and treasure. Someone at the White House should call Prime Minister Netanyahu and tell him in the most unambiguous terms as possible that attacking Iran’s suspected nuclear sites is not acceptable and if he chooses to do so nevertheless he and his country are on their own in dealing with the consequences. The U.S. can no longer afford to be a dog being wagged by its tail.
Wednesday, October 26, 2011
Leaving Iraq
I am constantly aware of the danger of crossing over from skeptic to cynic as an observer of American national security affairs. Nevertheless I am astonished by the reaction last week to President Obama’s announcement that U.S. troops will leave Iraq after eight years of war, over 4,400 U.S. lives, and more than a trillion dollars spent. My astonishment exists at the political, the strategic and the individual level.
Political opponents of President Obama such as Mitt Romney, Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham and others are criticizing him for executing a status of force agreement negotiated by George W. Bush, who the last I looked, is a fellow Republican. Bush negotiated this agreement before leaving office and Obama never repudiated it. In fact Obama is doing exactly what many Americans say they would like to have elected officials do; fulfill campaign promises. Candidate Obama said he would get us out of Iraq in a first term and never compromised that promise. (I, too, wish he had delivered on some others).
Strategically, some people believe and would like to have others believe that the U.S. now has and will have more influence in Iraq than Iran has. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said recently on Meet the Press, “No one should miscalculate America’s resolve and commitment to helping support the Iraqi democracy” and “We have paid too high a price to give Iraqis the chance. And I hope that Iran and no one else miscalculate that.” The fact is that Iran and Iraq are closely aligned by geography, religion, language, trade and a debt owed to Iran by current Iraqi leaders who lived in exile in Iran during Saddam Hussein’s rule. Muctada al Sadar, a radical cleric who is an Iranian proxy, is the power broker who kept the head of Iraq, Nuri al Maliki, in place. Furthermore the rational for keeping a U.S. military presence in Iraq, protecting Iraqi airspace, stabilizing its borders, and being an intelligence resource do not pass any rational test of demonstrated U.S. capability or intent.
Finally, I have had a number of conversations with my friends, neighbors and acquaintances who feel strongly that the withdrawal is a mistake. The irony of their position is that it not only lacks facts but more importantly the lack of commitment or investment. None of them served in the military and none of them have children or grandchildren who are serving in the military. So when I ask them if they are willing to pay a quarterly war tax to finance the Iraq war or have their children and/or grandchildren drafted to serve in Iraq, all say NO thus identifying themselves a chicken hawks at worst or uninformed limited liability patriots at best.
Political opponents of President Obama such as Mitt Romney, Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham and others are criticizing him for executing a status of force agreement negotiated by George W. Bush, who the last I looked, is a fellow Republican. Bush negotiated this agreement before leaving office and Obama never repudiated it. In fact Obama is doing exactly what many Americans say they would like to have elected officials do; fulfill campaign promises. Candidate Obama said he would get us out of Iraq in a first term and never compromised that promise. (I, too, wish he had delivered on some others).
Strategically, some people believe and would like to have others believe that the U.S. now has and will have more influence in Iraq than Iran has. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said recently on Meet the Press, “No one should miscalculate America’s resolve and commitment to helping support the Iraqi democracy” and “We have paid too high a price to give Iraqis the chance. And I hope that Iran and no one else miscalculate that.” The fact is that Iran and Iraq are closely aligned by geography, religion, language, trade and a debt owed to Iran by current Iraqi leaders who lived in exile in Iran during Saddam Hussein’s rule. Muctada al Sadar, a radical cleric who is an Iranian proxy, is the power broker who kept the head of Iraq, Nuri al Maliki, in place. Furthermore the rational for keeping a U.S. military presence in Iraq, protecting Iraqi airspace, stabilizing its borders, and being an intelligence resource do not pass any rational test of demonstrated U.S. capability or intent.
Finally, I have had a number of conversations with my friends, neighbors and acquaintances who feel strongly that the withdrawal is a mistake. The irony of their position is that it not only lacks facts but more importantly the lack of commitment or investment. None of them served in the military and none of them have children or grandchildren who are serving in the military. So when I ask them if they are willing to pay a quarterly war tax to finance the Iraq war or have their children and/or grandchildren drafted to serve in Iraq, all say NO thus identifying themselves a chicken hawks at worst or uninformed limited liability patriots at best.
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