The following op/ed by MG Laich appeared in the electronic version of the Columbus Dispatch
Let there be no mistake, we are considering going to war with Iran. The use of terms such as “surgical strikes” and “military option” are convenient euphemisms for acts of war. Since this would be a war of choice, another preventive war, serious questions arise as to whether it meets the Just War standard which has informed international actions for centuries. We should recall our recent history when we were told that Iraq had WMD, the war would be short, we would be welcomed as liberators, and Iraqi oil would pay for the war. “Shock and awe” morphed in “Aw shucks” as 4,500 Americans lost their lives, 30000 were seriously wounded, and it cost the US $2 trillion borrowed dollars in ten year long war that few suggest we won. In fact, the official 2012 U.S. Army Posture Statement states that “the mission in Iraqi has ended responsibility”….hardly a chest thumping assertion of success or claim to have won.
Those who assert that Iran is unable or unwilling to retaliate if we attack are engaging in magical thinking. Iran is the 18th largest land mass of all the nations in the world with 79 million citizens (larger than Iraq and Afghanistan combined). It has 545,000 active and 350,000 reserve troops and can mobilize 11 million more. In addition, they have a domestic military industrial base and a sizable navy. They have the capability to target and close the Strait of Hormuz which would drive up oil prices thus disrupting the world economy and a U.S. economic recovery as gasoline rises to $5-$8 per gallon. They can also target U.S .troops and civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan and U.S. interests worldwide, to include the U.S. homeland through terrorist support groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Finally, all out war in the Middle East would be distinct possibility with Russia, China, and India being unknown wild cards.
Iran has its own perspective regarding its security and national interests. Most American don’t know or conveniently forget that the American CIA overthrew the democratic government of Iran in 1953 and installed and supported the Shah of Iran in its war with Iraq in which Iran suffered between 500,000 and one million casualties. Iran is situated between two countries on its east and west that have been attacked and occupied by the U.S. Finally, Iran’s assessment of its own security is informed by Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal and the fact that the U.S. is the only nation to ever employ nuclear weapons…twice. Why would Iran not trust us?
If the US chooses to exercise its “military option” regarding Iran I would suggest three steps be taken. One, the President should request a Declaration of War from Congress. This would be the first such declaration since 1941. Require each member of Congress to take a share of responsibility in accordance with the Constitution. Second, impose a war tax on every American citizen to cover the cost of war thus not adding to the national debt rather than having China loan us the money. Third, implement a military draft with no deferments so the sons and daughters of all American can join the poor kids and patriots who have served these past ten years. This game affects the risk/reward analysis and final decisions.
We should be very careful going forward based on the wisdom of Winston Churchill who said “Once the dogs of war are unleashed, there is no controlling events.”
Thursday, March 29, 2012
Thursday, March 8, 2012
An Answer
On February 16 I posted a blog titled “Did we Win?” in Iraq. I am pleased to report that we have an official Department of the Army document that answers the question…sort of. The 2012 Army Posture Statement authored by the Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff states in the second sentence of page one of a thirty five page document that “The mission in Iraq has ended responsibly”…really? This appears to be as close as we get to an answer from Army “leaders” to the question, notwithstanding the fact that the theme of the Posture Statement is Prevent, Shape, Win.
Wednesday, February 22, 2012
Did We Win? - Part II
In my last blog posting I asked the question “Did we win?” in Iraq. The relevance of the question is that it informs our ongoing involvement in Afghanistan. The “Part II” question is “Did we win in Libya?” The stated mission was to protect civilian lives and remove Kaddafi. Both were accomplished at virtually no cost to the U.S. treasury, no U.S. service member’s lives lost and no cry from the international community to spend a trillion dollars to rebuild Libya. President Obama was criticized for leading from behind and allowing NATO to do the heavy lifting. Leading from behind looks pretty smart.
The relevance of asking this question regarding Libya is that today some are calling for the U.S. to intervene in Syria to protect civilians and oust an autocrat…sound familiar? I would suggest that what we learned about winning through our experiences in Iraq and Libya should be used to inform our decision regarding Syria.
The relevance of asking this question regarding Libya is that today some are calling for the U.S. to intervene in Syria to protect civilians and oust an autocrat…sound familiar? I would suggest that what we learned about winning through our experiences in Iraq and Libya should be used to inform our decision regarding Syria.
Thursday, February 16, 2012
Did We Win?
We Americans are a fundamentally competitive people. Part of that competitive culture is the concept of winning and losing. We ask, “Who won?” regarding everything from Little League games to legal battles and Super Bowls to presidential primaries. This national competitive spirit has served us well and produced great achievements in commerce, diplomacy, national security, and athletics and contributed to the belief in American exceptionalism.
Given this strong belief in competition and its byproduct of winning and losing and our recent withdrawal from Iraq after nine years of war at a cost of more than 4500 American lives and $2 trillion, I find it interesting that no one is asking whether or stating that we won…or lost. No officials in the Obama administration, no Republican presidential candidate, no talking head on television and no newspaper editorial writer has broached the question or offered and answer. If we did win, what did we win and was it worth the cost? I will not bias your answer to this question. “Did we win?” by offering mine, but I will state that I feel strongly that there were four clear winners in Iraq: China, Iran, the Iraqi Shehites, and Halliburton/Blackwater.
One might ask why it is important to engage the question of winning and losing in Iraq. The war is over for the US and our troops have left the country. The importance lays in the fact that we are still choosing to engage in a war in Afghanistan that is costing us $2 billion per week and generating American causalities every month as a result of commitment that is to last through 2014. Between now and 2014 we expect to lose hundreds of American lives and spend a quarter of a trillion dollars (borrowed from the Chinese and others) in Afghanistan. Many of the same questions regarding ends, ways and means that would frame the question of winning and losing in Iraq apply to Afghanistan. The difference is that Iraq is over and Afghanistan rages on. By declining to engage the question of winning or losing in Iraq, we forego the learning it might provide regarding Afghanistan. Perhaps that’s what we want since it’s a tough, potentially embarrassing question. We take this easy road though at the cost of US lives and treasure and create a new set of winners: Pakistan, the Taliban, a corrupt Afghan government supported by the U.S. and of course, Halliburton. If we ask today what a war in 2014 in Afghanistan would look like we should ask if its worth hundreds of American lives and a quarter of a trillion dollars today…in 2014 it’s too late.
Given this strong belief in competition and its byproduct of winning and losing and our recent withdrawal from Iraq after nine years of war at a cost of more than 4500 American lives and $2 trillion, I find it interesting that no one is asking whether or stating that we won…or lost. No officials in the Obama administration, no Republican presidential candidate, no talking head on television and no newspaper editorial writer has broached the question or offered and answer. If we did win, what did we win and was it worth the cost? I will not bias your answer to this question. “Did we win?” by offering mine, but I will state that I feel strongly that there were four clear winners in Iraq: China, Iran, the Iraqi Shehites, and Halliburton/Blackwater.
One might ask why it is important to engage the question of winning and losing in Iraq. The war is over for the US and our troops have left the country. The importance lays in the fact that we are still choosing to engage in a war in Afghanistan that is costing us $2 billion per week and generating American causalities every month as a result of commitment that is to last through 2014. Between now and 2014 we expect to lose hundreds of American lives and spend a quarter of a trillion dollars (borrowed from the Chinese and others) in Afghanistan. Many of the same questions regarding ends, ways and means that would frame the question of winning and losing in Iraq apply to Afghanistan. The difference is that Iraq is over and Afghanistan rages on. By declining to engage the question of winning or losing in Iraq, we forego the learning it might provide regarding Afghanistan. Perhaps that’s what we want since it’s a tough, potentially embarrassing question. We take this easy road though at the cost of US lives and treasure and create a new set of winners: Pakistan, the Taliban, a corrupt Afghan government supported by the U.S. and of course, Halliburton. If we ask today what a war in 2014 in Afghanistan would look like we should ask if its worth hundreds of American lives and a quarter of a trillion dollars today…in 2014 it’s too late.
Friday, January 20, 2012
Credibility Suffers in Face of DADT Warnings
The following Op Ed by Major General Laich appeared in the January 23 issue of Army Times.
It has now been almost four months since “don’t ask, don’t tell” was formally repealed on September 20. Four months does not make a history, but none of the catastrophic consequences of repeal predicted by its opponents has come to pass. There have been no mass resignations from the military, no barracks or shipboard riots, no mass gay rights demonstrations on military installations, no massive declines in enlistment or re-enlistment rates, and no declines in morale, discipline and cohesion. Repeal has been the nonevent its advocates predicted that it would be.
Some of the most vocal among repeal’s opponents were many of the military’s “senior leaders” charged with providing the commander in chief, Congress and the American people with their best military advice. The fact is these “senior leaders” were wrong. Whether they were wrong due to their personal biases, pandering to a conservative/evangelical base, or simply out of touch with the service members they are privileged to serve, they were wrong.
The young troops have proved themselves to be more mature, pragmatic and professional than their “senior leaders” projected them to be and, more alarmingly, than the “senior leaders” themselves (with the exception of Admirals (Mike) Mullen and (Robert) Papp). This is an alarming failure that should bring into question the judgment and perhaps the integrity of those “senior leaders” who advocated against repeal.
Many of these same “senior leaders” were perfectly willing, in response to recruiting shortfall in the 2004-2008 time frame, to lower enlistment standards while discharging trained service members under DADT. During that time frame, the Army raised the maximum age for enlistment, lowered the education and physical standards, and granted an all-time high number of moral waivers.
The net effect of these policy positions is that these “senior leaders” would rather man the force with middle-aged, unfit, undereducated felons than with young, fit, educated soldiers with clean police records, simply because of the latter group’s sexual orientation. The policy cost the military the contributions of more than 14,000 fully trained, qualified and, in many cases, combat-experience service members: a cost measured in tax-payer dollars, combat capability and military credibility.
Given the fact that these “senior leaders” appear to have been so wrong and the cost so high, a congressional inquiry, or at least a rigorous after-action review (with the results made public) would be appropriate. If neither is done, one might ask why we should accept the best military advice of these “senior leaders” on future tough issues. Credibility is earned by performance, not conferred by position.
It has now been almost four months since “don’t ask, don’t tell” was formally repealed on September 20. Four months does not make a history, but none of the catastrophic consequences of repeal predicted by its opponents has come to pass. There have been no mass resignations from the military, no barracks or shipboard riots, no mass gay rights demonstrations on military installations, no massive declines in enlistment or re-enlistment rates, and no declines in morale, discipline and cohesion. Repeal has been the nonevent its advocates predicted that it would be.
Some of the most vocal among repeal’s opponents were many of the military’s “senior leaders” charged with providing the commander in chief, Congress and the American people with their best military advice. The fact is these “senior leaders” were wrong. Whether they were wrong due to their personal biases, pandering to a conservative/evangelical base, or simply out of touch with the service members they are privileged to serve, they were wrong.
The young troops have proved themselves to be more mature, pragmatic and professional than their “senior leaders” projected them to be and, more alarmingly, than the “senior leaders” themselves (with the exception of Admirals (Mike) Mullen and (Robert) Papp). This is an alarming failure that should bring into question the judgment and perhaps the integrity of those “senior leaders” who advocated against repeal.
Many of these same “senior leaders” were perfectly willing, in response to recruiting shortfall in the 2004-2008 time frame, to lower enlistment standards while discharging trained service members under DADT. During that time frame, the Army raised the maximum age for enlistment, lowered the education and physical standards, and granted an all-time high number of moral waivers.
The net effect of these policy positions is that these “senior leaders” would rather man the force with middle-aged, unfit, undereducated felons than with young, fit, educated soldiers with clean police records, simply because of the latter group’s sexual orientation. The policy cost the military the contributions of more than 14,000 fully trained, qualified and, in many cases, combat-experience service members: a cost measured in tax-payer dollars, combat capability and military credibility.
Given the fact that these “senior leaders” appear to have been so wrong and the cost so high, a congressional inquiry, or at least a rigorous after-action review (with the results made public) would be appropriate. If neither is done, one might ask why we should accept the best military advice of these “senior leaders” on future tough issues. Credibility is earned by performance, not conferred by position.
Wednesday, January 4, 2012
U.S Would Regret Conflict with Iran
The letter to the editor by Major General Laich that follows was published in the January 3, 2012 edition of the Columbus Dispatch.
I was alarmed by last Tuesday’s letter “U.S. need not fear Iranian threat to Israel” from Austin Reid. It reminded me of the assurances given to the American people prior to the U.S. Invasion of Iraq that the war would be brief, we would be greeted as liberators and Iraqi oil would pay for the war. $2 trillion and 4,400 American lives later we know that this was magical thinking and that the enemy has a vote.
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, a realist not enrolled in the magical-thinking school, said earlier this month that an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities could “consume the Middle East in a confrontation and a conflict that we would regret.”
Reid wrote that “in the aftermath of an Israeli attack, Iran more than likely would respond as did Iraq and Syria and not retaliate” if Israel attacked its nuclear sites. Panetta, a host of national security experts and I disagree.
The conflict that would result would draw in the United States, based on its treaties with Israel; raise oil prices, leading to a double-dip U.S. recession; and unleash terrorist attacks by Iran’s proxies against U.S. targets worldwide, to include the U.S. homeland.
Unlike the Iraqi and Syrian targets Reid refers to having been successfully engaged by Israel in the past, the Iranian nuclear sites are dispersed, dug in and protected by anti-aircraft defenses, thus making an equally successful attack far less likely. Additionally, Israel would have to secure the permission of the Iraqi government to overfly its airspace or violate the airspace and Iraq’s sovereignty, which the United States is committed to protect.
Reid has his history correct, but the military and national security references he draws from it reflect magical thinking.
I was alarmed by last Tuesday’s letter “U.S. need not fear Iranian threat to Israel” from Austin Reid. It reminded me of the assurances given to the American people prior to the U.S. Invasion of Iraq that the war would be brief, we would be greeted as liberators and Iraqi oil would pay for the war. $2 trillion and 4,400 American lives later we know that this was magical thinking and that the enemy has a vote.
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, a realist not enrolled in the magical-thinking school, said earlier this month that an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities could “consume the Middle East in a confrontation and a conflict that we would regret.”
Reid wrote that “in the aftermath of an Israeli attack, Iran more than likely would respond as did Iraq and Syria and not retaliate” if Israel attacked its nuclear sites. Panetta, a host of national security experts and I disagree.
The conflict that would result would draw in the United States, based on its treaties with Israel; raise oil prices, leading to a double-dip U.S. recession; and unleash terrorist attacks by Iran’s proxies against U.S. targets worldwide, to include the U.S. homeland.
Unlike the Iraqi and Syrian targets Reid refers to having been successfully engaged by Israel in the past, the Iranian nuclear sites are dispersed, dug in and protected by anti-aircraft defenses, thus making an equally successful attack far less likely. Additionally, Israel would have to secure the permission of the Iraqi government to overfly its airspace or violate the airspace and Iraq’s sovereignty, which the United States is committed to protect.
Reid has his history correct, but the military and national security references he draws from it reflect magical thinking.
Monday, December 12, 2011
Doubly Dumb
Several years ago I was visiting the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks and my host invited me to have lunch with a war college student who was a senior officer in the Mexican military. He laid out the status of the Mexican drug war at the time. Then, the drug war in Mexico was nowhere “on my radar.” Since then I have followed it closely as it has become more intense and far reaching and U.S. civilian law enforcement and military have become more involved on both sides of the border. The U.S. press has also expanded its coverage. The effects of these drug wars in Mexico on overall violent deaths, official corruption, reluctance to invest, and civilian and military enforcements costs have been huge and are growing. Mexico is at the brink of being a failed narco state on our shared southern border of almost 2,000 miles; a compelling threat to our national security. To allow this to happen when there is a partial solution available to the U.S. would be dumb. If this same solution to the Mexican drug crisis would also help solve the U.S. budget deficit problem and we didn’t do it would also be dumb. Thus you have doubly dumb.
The action I allude to above is to legalize marijuana in the United States thus weakening the drug cartels by taking this revenue stream and tax marijuana in the U.S. as we do alcohol and tobacco; two equally pernicious but socially acceptable and heavily taxed vices. I am not suggesting that marijuana is “good” or “helpful.” I am suggesting that there are two good reasons for taking this action that substitutes being pragmatic and smart for being doubly dumb and hypocritical.
The action I allude to above is to legalize marijuana in the United States thus weakening the drug cartels by taking this revenue stream and tax marijuana in the U.S. as we do alcohol and tobacco; two equally pernicious but socially acceptable and heavily taxed vices. I am not suggesting that marijuana is “good” or “helpful.” I am suggesting that there are two good reasons for taking this action that substitutes being pragmatic and smart for being doubly dumb and hypocritical.
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